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The Proxy Advisory and Corporate
Governance Industry:
The Case for Increased Oversight and
Control
Tamara C. Belinfanti*
The proxy advisory and corporate governance industry plays a
significant role in shareholder voting and in the formulation of corporate
governance policy. The industry operates with relatively little
accountability and virtually free from regulatory oversight. Understanding
the relationship between this industry and mutual funds, which in the
aggregate are the largest owners of publicly traded shares in the United
States, is critical to understanding issues of shareholder rights, the meaning
of the right to vote in corporate elections, and the role that institutional
investors, like mutual funds, play in the corporate landscape.
Mutual funds exercise their substantial voting power by
outsourcing key voting functions and corporate governance decisions to the
proxy advisory industry. By far, the largest player in the industry is
Institutional Shareholder Services (n/k/a RiskMetrics Group, Inc.) (ISS),
which is estimated to advise half the world's common stock. This paper
examines the factual and theoretical implications on our corporate polity of
using proxy advisors like ISS. The paper addresses the problem from an
agency theory perspective and argues that the current relationship between
mutual funds and third-party agents like ISS is conceptually at odds with
corporate law agency theory. In addition, it is a relationship that has
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practical implications for public companies, long-term shareholders, and
our corporate landscape in general.
Introduction
Mutual funds are the largest owners of publicly traded shares in the United
States and play a central role in global financial markets. 1 At the end of 2007, mutual
funds managed an estimated $26 trillion in assets worldwide and held
approximately 24% of U.S. corporate stock.2
Mutual funds have substantial voting clout and the power to affect corporate
vote outcomes. Understanding how mutual funds exercise this substantial voting
power is critical to understanding issues of shareholder rights, the meaning of the
right to vote in corporate elections, and the role institutional investors, like mutual
funds, play in the corporate landscape.
In general, mutual funds exercise their substantial voting power by
outsourcing key proxy voting functions and corporate governance decisions to third-
party agents known as proxy advisors. 3 These proxy advisors operate, in large part,
free from stringent accountability and regulatory oversight. By far, the largest proxy
advisor is Institutional Shareholder Services (n/k/a RiskMetrics Group, Inc.) (ISS).4
For a fee, ISS provides purportedly independent proxy research and voting
advice to mutual funds and other institutional investors, and corporate governance
advice to public companies. 5 According to ISS, it advises "34 of the top 50" mutual
I INVESTMENT COMPANY INsTrruTE, 2008 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 6 - 36 (2008)
[hereinafter Investment Company Fact Book] (describing recent mutual fund trends and
stating that investment companies "as a whole are the largest group of investors in U.S.
companies, holding 27 percent of their outstanding stock"; according to Figure 1.4 of the
Investment Company Fact Book, 24% of the 27% of outstanding stock held by investment
companies is held by mutual funds).
2 See id.
3 This article focuses specifically on mutual funds and not other institutional
investors, such as pension funds, because in the aggregate, mutual funds are the largest
owners of public company stock.
4 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-765, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTORS 6, 13 Uune 2007) (This calculation is based on the aggregate portfolio equity size
of each proxy advisor's institutional clients, as reported in Table 1 of the report: Overview of
the Major Proxy Advisory Firms).
5 As discussed in Part I. A. and B., ISS also publishes corporate governance ratings of
public companies.
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funds.6 As of December 31, 2008, it advised approximately 2,800 organizations, 7 and
at the end of 2007, ISS advised an estimated $20 trillion of assets.8 A 2006 New York
Times article reported ISS' estimate that its advice affects the "governance decisions
of professional investors controlling.., half the value of the world's common stock." 9
Mutual funds rely on ISS' advice in determining how to vote portfolio shares
and 15-20% of mutual funds have even authorized ISS to automatically vote their
shares however it sees fit.10 In addition to providing proxy voting advice and
corporate governance related services to mutual funds and other institutional
investors, ISS also publishes corporate governance ratings on thousands of public
companies. Investors rely on these ratings, known as the "Corporate Governance
Quotient" or "CGQ," as indicators of the quality of a company's corporate
governance. According to ISS, "ISS' benchmark policies serve as an industry
standard and best practice guide to corporate governance."1
ISS plays an increasingly crucial role in corporate ballot issues, the
development of corporate governance standards, and is perceived to have significant
sway over corporate vote outcomes. As a measure of ISS' influence, consider that at
least one study found that ISS has the power to sway approximately 13% to 20% of a
given company's corporate vote. 12 Also consider that ISS is largely credited as the
deciding voice in pushing through the $19 billion merger of Hewlett-Packard Co.
("HP") and Compaq in 2002.13 Similarly, consider the case of 3M, where in 2003, ISS
6 Issproxy.com, Inst. S'holder Servs., Experience Matters: A Guide to Selecting the Right
Proxy Voting Partners, 11 (2008), available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/node/135565
(follow "SelectingTheRightProxyVotingPartner.pdf" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
7 RiskMetrics Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 15 (Dec. 31, 2008)
[hereinafter 2008 Annual Report].
8 RiskMetrics Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 10 (Dec. 31, 2007)
[hereinafter 2007 Annual Report].
9 See Robert D. Hershey, Jr., A Little Industry With a Lot of Sway on Proxy Votes, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 18, 2006, at S3.
10 RiskMetrics, supra note 8. See also Lynn A. Stout, Why Should ISS Be The New Master
Of The Corporate Governance Universe? CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. (Dow Jones Financial
Information Services, New York, N.Y.) Jan. 4, 2006, at 14 - 15.
11 2008 Annual Report, supra note 7, at 12.
12 See Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory
Environment on Shareholder Voting 2 (Ctr. for Corp. Gov. Working Paper Series WP 2002-002),
available at http://www.lerner.edel.edu/ccg/research-files/CCGWP2002-2.pdf.
13 ISS advised its institutional clients, which controlled 23% of HIP's shares to vote for
the merger. According to one Merrill Lynch & Co. (now Bank of America) analyst when
talking about the HP/ Compaq merger and ISS' role, "If [ISS] had gone the other way, the deal
Vol 14:2
Spring 2009 The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: 387
The Case for Increased Oversight and Control
effectively controlled the vote of 50% of 3M's total shares outstanding.14 In a 2003
letter to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), the then Chairman of
3M's board indicated that "[m]any of the top 30 institutional shareholders we
contacted in each of the past two years to discuss our position would not engage in
any meaningful discussions, often citing adherence to ISS proxy voting guidelines..
.-15 Corporate law scholar Professor Lynn Stout notes that, "[wihen institutional
investors follow ISS [vote recommendations] en masse, directors of public
corporations can expect to see 20%, 30% even 50% of their company's shares being
voted not as the directors recommend, but as ISS recommends." 16
This article argues that institutional shareholders' reliance on ISS without
any corresponding checks or balances on ISS, presents the hallmark problem of
"agency cost" that has plagued corporate law scholars for years1 7 In this article the
term "agency costs" is used in the traditional sense to refer to the problems that may
arise whenever one party (the "principal," in this case ISS' institutional clients)
outsources certain decisions or actions to a third party (the "agent" - ISS).18
The article addresses a gap in current corporate law literature, which has
traditionally focused on the problems of agency created by the separation of
ownership and control between the managers of a corporation and its shareholders
would have been dead." See Peter Burrows & Andrew Park, Compaq and HP: 'hat's an Investor
to Do?, BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 18, 2002, at 62.
14 In a 2003 letter to the SEC, the then Chairman of 3M's Board indicated that
"[alpproximately 55% of our top 50 institutional shareholders (representing about 50% of
shares outstanding) follow ISS proxy voting guidelines." The letter then went on to note that
"...ISS recommended that 3M stockholders approve this year's inapposite shareholder
proposal, despite its inconsistency with fundamental notions of lawful corporate governance,
and it won 58.9% of the vote." Letter from W. James McNerney, Jr., Chairman of the Board
and Ceo, 3M Corp., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Ex. Comm'n, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/3m120503.htm.
15 Id.
16 Stout, supra note 10.
17 See generally ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 76 (MacMillan Co. 1933) (1932) (discussing generally the agency costs
that arise as a result of the separation of ownership from control in a corporation). See also
Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301-
325 (1983).
18 It is acknowledged that in cases where ISS is simply providing corporate
governance ratings and not performing advisory services on behalf of the mutual fund
principal, the agency cost/agency theory framework may not be a perfect fit. However, even
where ISS is simply providing corporate governance ratings, because these ratings are often
relied upon by investors and substituted for investors own corporate governance diligence,
one can argue that ISS acts as a defacto agent in the governance ratings space.
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(the Berle-Means conception).19 However, our modem corporate landscape is
comprised of a complex web of inter-tangled agency relationships, such as the
relationship between ISS, mutual funds and corporations that muddle the traditional
Berle-Means conception. Investors' reliance on ISS presents a new flavor of the age-
old agency cost problem, which merits thorough examination. 20
Part I provides an overview of the proxy advisory and corporate governance
industry generally, and ISS specifically, 21 and examines the primary factors that have
fueled the proxy advisory and corporate governance industry's prominence in
today's corporate landscape. These include tangible factors such as the 2003 SEC
mutual fund disclosure voting regulations (the 2003 SEC Rule),22 the 1988 ERISA
pension fund voting requirements, 23 the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes-Oxley), 24
and the proposed New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Broker Voting Rules.25 In
addition, intangible factors such as the current call by academia, the media, and the
19 See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17. See also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C.
Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327, 332 (1983) ("[T]his problem of
separation of 'ownership' and 'control'...has troubled students of open corporations from
Adam Smith [1776] to Berle and Means [1932] and Jensen and Meckling [1976]").
20 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on
The Shared Interests of Managers and Labor In A More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33
J. CORP. L. 1, 17 ("Given the mountains of 401(k) money that American workers, as a practical
matter, will entrust to [institutional investors] for generations, the utility of considering
measures to guarantee greater alignment seems self-evident to anyone who has listened to
corporate law scholars beat the agency cost drum.").
21 For the sake of efficiency and for examining the problem of agency in the most
intensified form, it should be noted that this article focuses specifically on ISS, instead of the
proxy advisory and corporate governance industry as a whole. However, while much of the
factual substance under discussion is specific to ISS, the implications of what these facts reveal
is generally applicable to the third party proxy advisor and corporate governance industry as
a whole and the solutions proffered in Part V are also intended to be implemented in a general'
way to the entire industry.
22 Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies Voting Records By Registered Management
Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 25922, 17 C.F.R. 239, 249, 270,
274 (Jan. 31, 2003).
23 Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (2006).
24 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Sta. 745 (codified in various
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.).
25 In 2006, the New York Stock Exchange submitted a proposed rule to the SEC to
eliminate discretionary voting for all director elections. The proposed rule was not approved
by the SEC as the agency was conducting a more expansive review of shareholder access
issues. The NYSE resubmitted the proposed rule change on February 26, 2009. If approved by
the SEC prior to August 31, 2009, the proposed rule would be applicable to proxy votes for
shareholder meetings held on or after January 1, 2010.
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business world for greater shareholder control,26 could also have the unintended
effect of transferring more power to intermediaries like ISS.
Part I presents an overview of agency theory and its traditional treatment in
corporate law scholarship; provides an overview of the primary devices that are
recognized as effective controls on agency costs; and conceptualizes the agency costs
of ISS.
Part III analyzes features of ISS' business, and the market, legal, and
regulatory topography which have created an opportunity for ISS to operate
virtually unchecked and with minimal accountability to those whom its decisions
affect. Specifically, the article focuses on the following characteristics of ISS'
operating framework - (i) the lack of market check on ISS' activities; (ii) the lack of
transparency in ISS' decision-making process; (iii) the absence of fiduciary duty
restraint; and (iv) the limited ability of ISS' clients to exercise "exit" or "voice,"
meaning that ISS' clients may be practically and psychologically restrained in their
ability to sever ties from ISS and use another proxy advisor ("exit"), and these clients
may have little incentive to voice concerns to ISS ("voice"). 27
Part IV addresses several potential counterarguments to the position that ISS
agency costs are significant and need to be addressed. These include the argument
that ISS is not that influential; the argument that mutual funds are free to vote their
portfolio stock however they choose thereby having the ability to curtail any
problems of agency; and the argument that the market provides a built-in restraint
against ISS agency costs. Part IV demonstrates that both the perception of, and
actions of, mutual funds and the market show that these arguments are not
persuasive.
26 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833 (2005) (arguing for an increase in the use of shareholder power through various
mechanisms, such as increased ballot access, as a means for controlling company managers).
See also Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REv. 789 (2007)
(addressing the argument that shareholders should be given greater influence over boards
and arguing that "calls for greater 'shareholder democracy' appeal to laymen, the business
media, and even many business experts not because they are based on evidence, but because
they have a strong emotional allure.").
27 See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, ExiT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970) (discussing the
combined strategic use of "exit" and "voice" to increase an organization's efficiency).
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Part V proposes three potential solutions to the agency costs generated by
ISS.28 The first solution calls for the SEC to consider regulating the proxy advisory
and corporate governance industry, similar to the regulation it is currently
contemplating for nationally recognized statistical rating organizations
("NRSROs). 29 The second solution contemplates establishing an oversight board for
the proxy advisory and corporate governance industry similar in objective and
mandate to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) established
for auditor oversight. The intended goal of this second proposal would be to
implement a structure of systematic accountability and checks on the proxy advisory
and corporate governance rating industries. The third solution focuses on
incentivizing mutual funds to exercise their right to vote on behalf of their
underlying fund shareholders in a more meaningful and diligent way. The objective
of this third solution would be to encourage ISS mutual fund clients to pay more
attention to the quality of ISS' decisions and not simply follow ISS'
recommendations.
The article concludes by asserting that outsourcing proxy voting and
monitoring functions to ISS creates significant agency costs. On balance, while
acknowledging some of the arguments that may temper the significance of these
agency costs, and despite the complexities involved in crafting workable solutions to
minimize these agency costs, the problem of ISS agency cost is real and should be
addressed ex ante before mutual fund reliance on ISS proves misplaced. Ultimately,
should ISS' advice prove misguided, the parties who stand to bear the brunt of any
losses are the individual investor who has entrusted his/her money to mutual funds
and the public companies who are impacted by ISS' decisions.
I. The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry
Proxy advisory firms provide proxy analyses and voting recommendations
to institutional shareholders, while corporate governance rating firms issue
28 In a 2007 article, Professor Paul Rose addresses potential solutions to conflict of
interest concerns in the proxy advisory industry. See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance
Industry,32 J. CORP. L. 887 (2007) (examining the role of the corporate governance industry as a
voluntary regulator and proposing potential solutions to conflict of interest concerns within
the proxy advisory industry).
29 See Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-57967, 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249b (June 16, 2008), [hereinafter
SEC NRSRO Proposed Rule].
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governance scores which are supposed to help investors evaluate the quality of a
company's corporate governance practices. Both industries have a limited number of
participants. ISS is currently the only firm that provides proxy advisory services,
offers corporate governance advisory services to public companies, and issues
corporate governance ratings on public companies. 30
A. The Corporate Governance Rating Industry
The main players in the commercial corporate governance rating industry
include ISS, GovernanceMetrics International, The Corporate Library, Audit
Integrity, Morningstar, Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investor Services and Fitch
Ratings Ltd.. Each firm produces corporate governance ratings of public companies,
but the ratings differ in terms of focus, computational methods, qualitative factors,
corresponding weights ascribed to each factor, and the assumptions included in the
firm's ratings model. The rating firms also differ based on the aggregate number of
ratings they produce and whether the ratings are limited to a particular type of
public operating company. Some firms make their ratings available to the public
while others do not. For example, ISS' CGQ for each company it rates is readily
accessible to the public on that company's Yahoo!® Finance page. In contrast,
GovernanceMetrics' ratings are available on a subscription basis only.
With the exception of The Corporate Library ratings, all of the corporate
governance rating firms use proprietary algorithms and proprietary quantitative
analysis to generate their respective corporate governance ratings. ISS' CGQ is
explored in depth in Part I.C.2.a. below.
B. The Proxy Advisory Industry
The proxy advisory industry has grown over the past twenty years as a
result of various market and regulatory developments. In 1988, the U.S. Department
of Labor took the position that the voting of proxies of shares of stock owned by a
pension plan was part of the plan's fiduciary duty to manage employee benefit plan
30 ISS' chief competitor, Glass, Lewis & Co. (Glass Lewis), does produce a governance
weighting system known as the "Board Accountability Index" or "BAI." The BAI is comprised
of all companies in the S&P 500. According to Glass Lewis, the BAI "uses a modified market-
cap weighting algorithm that adjusts a company's weight based on the presence or absence of
five critical corporate governance features". These "critical corporate governance features" are
based on a study by Professors Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell. See Glass
Lewis, Board Accountability Index, http://www.glasslewis.com/solutions/bai.php (last
visited Apr. 3, 2009).
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assets.31 This development prompted managers of employee retirement plan assets
to seek help from the proxy advisory industry to satisfy their fiduciary
responsibilities to vote proxies in the best interests of their clients. The proxy
advisory industry, particularly ISS which had been established three years earlier in
1985, began to grow. 32 ISS owes much of its growth during this period to the fact
that it was the only proxy advisor at the time that covered a range of companies. 33
In the 1990s and early 2000s, ISS' reputation and dominance in the proxy
advisory industry continued to increase, and was further accelerated by a rise in
shareholder activism by institutional investors. 34 In the wake of the corporate
scandals and ultimate collapse of companies like Enron and Worldcom, institutional
investors became more active and turned to the proxy advisory industry for
assistance in assessing the corporate governance practices of operating companies
and in performing proxy voting functions. 35
The watershed moment for the proxy advisory industry came with the
passage of the 2003 SEC Rule that required mutual funds to disclose their complete
voting records annually.36 The 2003 SEC Rule also required mutual funds to adopt
policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that proxies would be voted
in the best interests of their clients.37 An unintended consequence of these
requirements was a swell in demand for proxy advisory and governance services. 38
31 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4, at 6. See also Proxy Voting by
Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 (2003) (final rule) (codified in various sections of 17
C.F.R. Part 275). See also ERISA, supra note 23 (setting forth the Dept. of Labor's interpretation
of ERISA as it applies to the voting of proxies).
32 ISS was not the first proxy advisory firm. Proxy Monitor Inc., which was founded
in 1984, preceded ISS. However, in 2001 ISS merged with Proxy Monitor.
33 Marco Consulting Group (MCG), another proxy advisor, was founded in 1988.
However, MCG provides proxy advisory services only to Taft-Hartley funds. See Section I.C.
below for a more detailed discussion of MCG and other proxy advisors.
34 See U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4, at 6 - 7.
35 Id.
36 See 17 C.F.R. 239, supra note 22.
37 See 17 C.F.R. 239, supra note 22.
38 ISS, and two other proxy advisors-Proxy Governance, Inc. and Egan-Jones Proxy
Services - all reference this 2003 SEC Rule as a significant factor in the increased demand for
proxy advisory services. See, e.g., 2007 Annual Report, supra note 8, at 24 ("ISS' historical
growth has been due to increased regulatory requirements, highly visible corporate scandals,
increased shareholder activism and corporate chief executive officers and boards of directors
that are increasingly concerned about, and responsive to, shareholder concerns."). See also
Proxy Governance, Inc., https://www.proxygovemance.com/content/pgi/content/
history.shtml [hereinafter PGI] (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) ("In 2003, encouraged by a
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The SEC adopted the 2003 SEC Rule with the hope that "requiring greater
transparency of proxy voting by funds [would] encourage funds to become more
engaged in corporate governance of issuers held in their portfolios, which [in turn
would] benefit all investors and not just fund shareholders." 39 For their part, mutual
funds have become "more engaged in corporate governance" by outsourcing key
monitoring and voting functions to agents like ISS. According to Professor Lynn
Stout, "the actual result [of the SEC's 2003 Rule] has been to drive the fund industry
even deeper into the arms of ISS."40
This increased coziness between ISS and other proxy advisors, on one hand,
and mutual funds and institutional investors, on the other, shows no signs of
abating. The current financial crisis may well result in further regulation regarding
corporate governance standards and if it does, then ISS and other proxy advisors are
likely to see an increase in the demand for their services.41 In addition, the
percentage of equity securities held by institutional investors, particularly mutual
funds, continues to increase sharply. 42 These investors are more likely to receive
voting advice from proxy advisors and be influenced by these advisors'
recommendations.
In addition, current proposals for greater shareholder rights championed by
corporate law scholars43 will actually transfer more influence to ISS and the proxy
advisory industry, as institutional shareholders, and not individual shareholders, are
the predominant shareholders of record in modern corporate society. Many of these
developing regulatory environment that would expand the market for proxy advisory and
voting services, [our parent company] reinitiated developmental work [to create a proxy
advisory service] ...."); Egan-Jones Proxy Services http://www.ejproxy.com/ [hereinafter
Egan-Jones] (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) ("With SEC mandated proxy voting disclosure rules
pushed to the forefront by renewed concerns of corporate governance.. professional investors
and fund managers will increasingly find value in [our] services.").
39 Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies Voting Records by Registered Management
Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,739, 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 249,
274 (Sept. 20, 2002).
40 See Stout, supra note 10.
41 ISS acknowledged this in its 2008 Annual Report. See 2008 Annual Report, supra
note 7 at 16 ("In general, regulation has been a key driver to our business growth. In the event
that the current financial crisis results in further regulation, we believe that such regulation
could be a driver for growth in our business.").
42 See Investment Company Fact Book, supra note 1.
43 See generally Bebchuk, supra note 26; Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional
Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 38 UCLA L. REV. 871, 895 (1992) (arguing for
greater institutional voice).
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institutional investors in turn outsource their proxy monitoring and information
gathering functions to third-parties like ISS. As Vice Chancellor Leo Strine of the
Delaware Court of Chancery stated, "[t]he influence of ISS and its competitors over
institutional investors' voting behavior is so considerable that [one] should be
concerned that any initiative to increase stockholder power will simply shift more
clout to firms of this kind - firms even more unaccountable than their institutional
investor clients." 44
Finally, the proposed NYSE broker voting rule would have the effect of
transferring more sway over proxy voting outcomes to ISS and other proxy
advisors. 45 Current NYSE rules permit brokers to vote on "routine" proposals if the
beneficial owner of the stock has not provided specific voting instructions to the
broker at least ten days prior to a scheduled meeting.46 Uncontested director
elections are considered "routine" under the NYSE's current rules. The proposed
amendments would make all director elections "non-routine," however, which
would mean that brokers would only be able to vote on director elections if they
have received instructions from beneficial owners. If the proposed amendments
become effective, and issuers/brokers are unable to obtain voting instructions from
large numbers of individual shareholders, then there will be a significant shift in
voting power from brokers to institutions, such as mutual funds, and in turn to
proxy advisors like ISS. 47 A 2002 study found that ISS recommended that
shareholders vote against 78.1 percent of the proposals that the authors estimated to
have been determined by broker discretionary votes.48
Institutional investors' reliance on proxy advisors has become a permanent
and central feature of today's corporate vote. Understanding what these proxy
advisors do and the limitations inherent in relying on their advice, is key to
maintaining the integrity of the corporate vote.
44 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Towards A True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response To
Lucian's Solution For Improving Corporate America (John M. Olin Center For Law, Economics,
and Business, Harvard University, Discussion Paper No. 541, 2/2006), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/papers/541_Strine.php (follow "541:
PDF link to download).
45 See supra note 25 (discussing the NYSE proposed rule change).
46 See supra note 25.
47 See David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Activist Shareholders Would Gain Power
From Proposed Rule Change, New York Law Journal (2009) (discussing effects of the NYSE
proposed rule change regarding broker discretionary votes).
48 Bethel & Gillan, supra note 12.
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C. The Players in the Proxy Advisory Industry
According to a 2007 Report by the United States Government Accountability
Office examining "Issues Relating to Firms That Advise Institutional Investors on
Proxy Voting" (the GAO Report),49 the proxy advisory industry in the U.S. is
comprised of five major firms, "with ISS serving as the dominant player ... "o The
other four players in the industry are Marco Consulting Group (MCG), Glass Lewis
& Co. (Glass Lewis), Proxy Governance, Inc. (PGI) and Egan-Jones Proxy Services
(Egan-Jones). MCG, Glass Lewis, PGI and Egan-Jones have "much smaller client
bases [than ISS] and are "relatively new to the market,"5 l with Glass Lewis, PGI and
Egan-Jones created within the past seven years.5 2 Of the four proxy advisors
identified in the GAO Report, ISS considers Glass Lewis and PGI to be its primary
competitors.53
Below is a brief overview of MCG, Glass Lewis, PGI and Egan-Jones, as well
as a more detailed overview of ISS and its operations.
1. MCG, PGI, Egan-Jones and Glass Lewis
MCG, PGI and Egan-Jones, together control approximately three percent of
the proxy advisory industry.54 Glass Lewis controls approximately 36 percent of the
market.55
MCG was established in 1988 to provide investment analysis and advice to
Taft-Hartley funds.56 Since inception, MCG has expanded its client base to include
49 See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4.
so Id. at 7. A sixth proxy advisor, CtW Investment Group, was formed in February
2006 and provides a limited number of recommendations to union pension funds. See CtW
Investment Group - Who We Are, available at
http://www.ctwinvestmentgroup.com/index.php?id=l (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
51 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4.
52 See id. at 7-8.
53 2007 Annual Report, supra note 8. See also 2008 Annual Report, supra note 7.
54 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4. The GAO Report indicated
that ISS' clients manage approximately $25.5 trillion in equity assets, Glass Lewis' clients
manage approximately $15 trillion, PGI's clients manage approximately $1 trillion and MCG's
clients manage approximately $85 billion. Equity assets under management were not
provided for Egan-Jones' clients.
55 See id.
56 The Labor Management Relations Act, also known as the Taft-Hartley Act, allows
for the establishment of multiemployer trust funds, known as Taft-Hartley funds, for the
purpose of providing pension and welfare benefits to employees and their families. Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2007).
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance
public employee benefit plans. 57 MCG's services are specifically targeted to benefit
plan sponsor clients and approximately 4% of its revenues derive from its proxy
voting services.5 8 MCG is not affiliated with any other company or organization and
it is privately owned by the employees of the firm.59 PGI was established in 2004 and
provides proxy analysis and voting advice. PGI is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
FOLIOfn, Inc., a financial services company that also provides brokerage services
and portfolio management technology for individual investors and investment
advisers.60 PGI provides research coverage and proxy voting recommendations on
both U.S. and non-U.S. publicly reporting companies. The scope of PGI's coverage is
determined by the "securities held in client portfolios." 61 PGI describes its analyses
as "transparent" and states that it does provide "clearly stated rationales for all...
recommendations." 62 Similarly, Egan-Jones provides proxy advisory services to
institutional clients. Egan-Jones was established in 2002 as a division of Egan-Jones
Rating Company, which was incorporated in 1992.63 Egan-Jones markets itself as
providing advice that is conflict-free, having deep expertise in credit risk analyses,
and being the low-cost provider in the proxy advisory industry. 64
Based on market share and market perception, ISS' main competitor is Glass
Lewis.65 A 2004 New York Times article declared that "Glass Lewis has unseated
[ISS].. .from its position as the undisputed leader in the field."66 Like PGI and Egan-
Jones, Glass Lewis provides proxy research and voting recommendations to
institutional investors. Glass Lewis' coverage appears to be more expansive than
PGI's and Egan-Jones', covering 16,000 public companies across 65 countries. 67 Glass
Lewis was founded in 2003 and in 2007 it became an independent wholly-owned
57 Marco Consulting Group, http://www.marcoconsulting.com/ Company-
history.html (the "Company History" section of the website) (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 See PGI, supra note 38.
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 See Egan-Jones, supra note 38.
64Id.
65 See U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4.
66 Gretchen Morgenson, How To Succeed on Wall Street, Conflict-Free, N. Y. TIMES, Dec.
19, 2004, at S3.
67 Glass Lewis & Co., What We Do, http://www.glasslewis.com/solutions/
index.php (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Glass Lewis]. PGI's website indicates that its
parent company casts electronic proxy votes on "more than 4,000 companies." See PGI, supra
note 38.
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subsidiary of Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board.68 Glass Lewis' clients
collectively manage more than $15 trillion in assets, 69 compared to ISS, whose clients
manage approximately $25.5 trillion in assets.70
Glass Lewis has been able to make inroads into ISS' market share because
Glass Lewis, like ISS, offers broad coverage and services. Unlike ISS, however, Glass
Lewis does not sell its corporate governance advice to public companies.71 Glass
Lewis is thus free from the perceived conflict-of-interest problems that cloud ISS'
recommendations. Even though Glass Lewis has been able to cut into ISS' market
share, the current gap between Glass Lewis' coverage and that of ISS is stark. ISS
offers proxy advice on over 50,000 companies, while Glass Lewis offers proxy advice
on only 16,000 companies. ISS remains the clear industry leader.
2. ISS
Founded in 1985, ISS has become the market leader in both corporate
governance ratings and proxy voting recommendations.72 ISS remained a private
company until 2008 when it was acquired by RiskMetrics Group, Inc.73 ISS maintains
substantial power and influence over both corporate voting decisions and corporate
governance issue. ISS controls the bulk of the industry with over 61 % market share.74
As a measure of ISS' influence, consider the following:
ISS provides voting recommendations to approximately 1,650 financial
institutions and to 1,200 corporations and professional service
organizations. 75
68 See Glass Lewis, supra note 67.
69 See id.
70 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILrrY OFFICE, supra note 4, at 7.
71 See Glass Lewis, supra note 67. See also Morgenson, supra note 66. Because ISS has
been heavily critiqued for having a conflict of interest (See infra note 87), other competitors
such as Egan Jones also market themselves as being free from conflict of interest concerns. See
Egan Jones, supra note 38 ("[T]he integrity of our recommendations is not clouded with
complication of also selling corporate directors and managers consulting services pertaining to
[the same] shareholder proposals [on which we provide advice].").
72 See also Hershey, supra note 9.See generally U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 4.
7 RiskMetrics acquired ISS in January 2007 for an estimated $550 million. However,
RiskMetrics did not go public until January 2008. See Jeff Nash, Advise this: Glass Lewis On The
Block, FIN. WK.; September 24, 2007. See also 2007 Annual Report, supra note 8.
74 See supra note 54.
75 2007 Annual Report, supra note 8, at 14.
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* By ISS' own estimates, its opinions affect the governance decisions of
institutional investors controlling $20 trillion in assets.76
* ISS claims to advise "24 of the top 25" and "81 of the top 100" mutual funds,
all "25 of the top 25" asset managers and "17 of the top 25" public pension
funds. 77
* Approximately 15-20% of ISS' clients utilize a service that automatically
votes the clients' shares according to its recommendations. 7
* ISS' coverage is the most expansive of all the proxy advisors, covering more
than 50,000 companies,79 and in 2008 ISS issued proxy research and vote
recommendations for over 45,000 shareholder meetings across 110
countries.80
* In 2008, ISS cast 7.6 million ballots on behalf of its clients, representing over
1.3 trillion shares.81
a. ISS' Services
ISS divides its services into three categories. The first category is its
"Governance Research" service, which consists of its proxy advisory services,
custom proxy advice services, "M&A Edge," "Voting Analytics," and CGQ ratings.
The second group of services is its "Fiduciary Services," consisting of proxy voting
services, SEC Class Action Services, Vote Disclosure Services, and Global Proxy
Distribution. ISS' third class of services is its "Enabling Governance" service, which
consists of its Policy "Gateway," "Governance Exchange" and "Policy Exchange."
ISS provides its services on a subscription basis. While clients may select
individual services, the bulk of ISS' clients choose to bundle their services. 82 ISS sets
76 Id.
77 RiskMetrics Group, EXPERIENCE MATTERS: A GUIDE TO SELECTING THE RIGHT PROXY
VOTING PARTNERS 9 (2008),
http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/SelectingTheRightProxyVotingPartner.pdf
78 See 2007 Annual Report, supra note 8. See also Dean Starkman, A Proxy Advisor's
Two Sides: Some Question Work of ISS for Companies It Scrutinizes, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2006, at
D1 (citing a statement by Susan E. Wolf, chairman of the Society of Corporate Secretaries and
Governance Professionals and Vice President at Schering-Plough Corporation).
79 2007Annual Report, supra note 8, at 10.
80 2008 Annual Report, supra note 7.
81 Id.
82 See id at 11 ("Although some of our Proxy Research and Voting clients purchase
our proxy research on a stand-alone basis, the vast majority purchase a comprehensive
research and voting product.").
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its subscription rate so that the total cost of its services decreases the more services a
client receives from ISS. ISS does not offer its services to individual investors.
In its role as proxy advisor, ISS reviews the various company and
shareholder proposals put up for vote at a company's annual meeting, analyzes
these proposals, and offers advice on how institutional investors should vote their
shares. Prior to the start of each proxy season ISS releases a statement about its proxy
voting policies in which it highlights the key changes to its policies from the
previous year. For example, at the end of 2008 ISS updated its proxy voting policies
for 2009 to expand the executive compensation pay practices that it will consider in
making a vote recommendation. 83 Practices such as tax gross-ups on executive perks
and "walk away" rights that provide for the payment of severance upon a voluntary
resignation, may now trigger a withhold recommendation from ISS.84 ISS views its
policy changes as necessitated by a changing and dynamic corporate environment.
85
In contrast, ISS' critics view many of these policy changes as being symptomatic of
under-informed judgments in the first instance rather than well thought out policies,
or as being part of a continued march to advance activist agendas at the expense of
allowing corporate boards to make decisions traditionally within their control.
86
On the corporate governance side, ISS issues corporate governance ratings
for public companies and offers a service to public companies whereby these
companies can hire ISS to help them improve their corporate governance. Not
83 See Press Release, RiskMetrics Group, RiskMetrics Group Releases 2009 Proxy
Voting Policies (Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/press/2009-policy.
84 See U.S. Corporate Governance Policy 2009 Updates, RiskMetrics Group, (Nov. 25,
2008), available at
http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/RMG2009PolicyUpdateUnitedStates.pdf.
85 See, e.g., RiskMetrics Group, RiskMetrics Group 2009 Benchmark Voting Policy
Updates, Harvard Law School Corp. Gov. Forum, Dec. 23, 2008, available at http:
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/ 2008/12/23/riskmetrics-group-2009-benchrnark-
voting-policy-updates/ ("This year's policy revisions reflect the unprecedented market
turmoil that has sparked investor and regulatory focus on executive compensation practices,
board accountability and oversight, and the quality of financial reporting.").
86 See, e.g., Stout, supra note 10 (" [T]here is reason to doubt whether ISS analysts have
particularly good insight into what makes for 'good corporate governance.' Instead, ISS
seems to simply follow governance fads and fancies."). See also David A. Katz & Laura
McIntosh, RiskMetrics Update Continues to Hamper Director Discretion, New York Law Journal
Oan. 23, 2009), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/
PubArticlelHC.jsp?id=1202427663057 ("[The 2009] policy updates continue [ISS'] trend of
espousing policies that tend to shift control from boards of directors to shareholders,
including activists and special interest groups.").
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surprisingly, this aspect of ISS' business has led to charges that ISS is conflicted.8 7 In
response to these charges, ISS has created a firewall between its corporate
governance ratings and corporate governance advice businesses, and has created a
separate subsidiary (ISS Corporate Services) to provide governance services to
corporations. 88 Despite ISS' efforts to avoid conflict-of-interest concerns, these
concerns are still widely prevalent in the market.
b. The "CGQ" - ISS' Corporate Governance Ratings
ISS' corporate governance ratings are generated by a proprietary system
known as the "Governance Analytics" platform. ISS refers to this resulting rating as
the "Corporate Governance Quotient" (CGQ), and describes it as "a dynamic
corporate governance rating tool that helps investors manage investment risk and
drive value while also helping corporations perform peer analysis and benchmark
their corporate governance practices." 89 According to a study from Stanford
University, board members perceive a link between a company's CGQ and how ISS
87 See Morgenson, supra note 66. Not surprisingly, ISS vehemently denies charges that
its advice suffers from a conflict of interest. See, e.g., Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter (September 15, 2004), available at
http://sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/iss91504.htm (responding to letter from ISS
requesting relief that an adviser may fulfill its duties under the Adviser Act to determine that
an independent proxy adviser is capable of making impartial recommendations by examining
the conflict of interest procedures that the adviser has adopted. In ISS's letter, as reproduced
in the SEC response, ISS maintains that it "has erected a firewall between its institutional and
corporate activities in order to maintain the highest level of objectivity" and that its proxy
voting staff and corporate governance staff operate out of separate and secure areas.). Contra
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4, at 4 ("[T]he business model of [ISS]... has
been cited by industry participants and analysts as creating a significant potential conflict of
interest."); see also Report And Recommendations Of The Proxy Working Group To The New
York Stock Exchange, available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/PWG REPORT.pdf
[hereinafter NYSE Working Group] (recommending, inter alia, that further investigation be
conducted on the role of institutional advisory services that make "vot[e] recommendations
and/or decisions over shares in which they do not own or have an economic interest." The
Working Group indicated that it believed that proxy advisory firms have "the potential for
possible conflicts.").
88 2008 Annual Report, supra note 7, at 16.
89 Memo from Institutional Shareholder Services to US CGQ-rated companies Re:
CGQ Methodology Evolves to Align Rating with Financial Performance,
http://www.acte.org/initiatives/csr/CGQevolvingmethodologyWP.pdf (last visited Apr. 3,
2009).
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advises its clients to vote on particular proxy proposals put forth on the company's
ballot.90
ISS analyzes 65 factors to determine each U.S. company's CGQ and analyzes
55 factors for non-U.S. companies.91 The 65 rating factors that comprise the CGQ for
U.S. companies fall into the following eight categories: (i) "Board;" (ii) "Audit;" (iii)
"State of Incorporation;" (iv) "Executive and Director Compensation;" (v)
"Qualitative Factors;" (vi) "Ownership;" (vii) "Director Education;" and (viii)
"Charter/Bylaws." 92 Each company is assigned two CGQ ratings: a market CGQ,
which compares the company to the relative market index (e.g., S&P 500, Mid-Cap
400 or Small Cap 600) and an industry CGQ, which compares the company to its
industry peer group (e.g., travel and leisure or healthcare equipment and services).
Over time, ISS has added and subtracted factors from the CGQ and has
changed the weight it accords to these factors in an attempt to reflect current
corporate governance trends.93 For example, in 2006 the CGQ was updated to
include ratings criteria for options backdating, director withhold recommendations
and majority voting.94
ISS uses proprietary weights to construct the CGQ. ISS does not disclose the
weight assigned to each variable or the inter-relationship among the various sub-
variables and variables, which individually and collectively may impact a company's
90 See Robert Daines et al., Rating the Ratings: How Good Are Commercial Governance
Ratings? 4 (June 26, 2008) (Stanford University Rock Center for Corporate Governance,
Working Paper) [hereinafter Daines Study] ("[I]n our interviews with board of directors, we
find that board members believe that [corporate governance] ratings are an influential and
important input into the recommendations made to shareholders concerning proxy statement
proposals."). However, the Daines Study went on to note that "we find virtually no evidence
that ISS ratings affect... [the] proxy proposal recommendations made by ISS..." Similarly, in a
2007 article, Professor Paul Rose noted that: "Proxy advisers generally base their decisions on
corporate governance standards that are derived from the same policies as those used to
formulate governance ratings and related governance advice." See Rose, supra note 28, at 898.
91 Issproxy.com, US Corporate Governance Quotient Criteria,
http://www.issproxy.com/issgovernance/esg/uscgqcriteria.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2009)
[hereinafter CGQ Criteria].
92 See CGQ Criteria, supra note 91.
93 Oppenheimer Corporate Finance & Transactions Alert, Mhat's Your CGQ "IQ"?
Vhat Every Corporate Executive Should Know About The Corporate Governance Quotient,
http://www.oppenheimer.com/newsletters/CGQIQ.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) ("The
CGQ methodology is updated periodically to reflect the most current corporate governance
trends.").
94 Id.
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CGQ score. ISS maintains that it has weighted the proprietary variables in each
category according to how important it determines each variable to be.
c. Critiques of ISS' Services
No one except ISS knows exactly how the CGQ is derived, yet the CGQ has
become the benchmark for assessing the quality of a public corporations' corporate
governance. Moreover, it is questionable whether ISS' CGQ is a reliable benchmark.
ISS has been criticized for suffering from conflict of interest problems, 95
using faulty analysis, making errors, mistakes or omissions that impact its proxy
voting advice and CGQ ratings, 96 hiring relatively unskilled employees to conduct
governance analysis, 97 being "blatantly opportunistic" in peddling its services, 98 and
for merely following the fad of the time instead of developing sound corporate
governance policies.99 As Professor Lynn Stout noted in a 2006 article:
[Tihere is reason to doubt whether ISS analysts have particularly
good insight into what makes for 'good corporate governance.
Instead, ISS seems to simply follow governance fads and fancies.
[For example, ISS' position on staggered boards and other anti-
takeover protections is] extreme . . . and relies on some flawed
academic studies that looked only at how anti-takeover protections
95 See Morgenson, supra note 66; See also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 4; NYSE Working Group, supra note 87.
96 See Monica Langley, Want to Lift Your Company's Ranking on Corporate Governance?
Buy the Test, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2003 (quoting ISS' Senior Vice-President, Patrick McGurn
statement that, "occasionally we miss one" and his acknowledgment that in at least one
instant ISS "had not made the [appropriate] disclosures nor check[ed] the reports to see if it
had." The Senior Vice-President then stated, "We screwed up... [and ISS] was embarrassed by
the [revealed] operational misstep.")
97 See Rose, supra note 28, at 897 ("ISS.. .has been known to use relatively unskilled
temporary employees to conduct governance reviews...") (citing article by Eleanor Laise, Is
This The Most Influential Man on Wall Street?, SmartMoney Mag., Oct. 16, 2002).
98 Langley, supra note 93. (Agilent Technologies Inc.'s General Counsel, Craig
Nordlund, in discussing conversations with ISS over ISS' ratings of Agilent and the use of ISS'
services, noted that ISS notified Agilent that "it would be rating [Agilent] on its corporate
governance and that, for a fee of $16,000, [ISS] could provide guidance [to Agilent] on
improving its scores." Nordlund related that he told ISS, "[tihis is blatantly opportunistic. I
feel less like we're getting rated and more like we're getting pressured to buy another
product.").
99 See Joann S. Lublin, Turning the Tables; RiskMetric's Head Faces His Day of Shareholder
Judgment, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2008, at C1.
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affected share price around the time a takeover bid was made, and
ignores evidence that anti-takeover defenses can enhance share
performance measured over longer periods.100
Despite these concerns about the quality of ISS' services, ISS continues to be
the preferred choice for mutual funds, ostensibly because ISS is the largest and most
established player in the proxy industry. Hiring ISS provides a sense of security as
most mutual funds use ISS, and ISS offers the largest scope of company coverage.
Vice Chancellor Strine summed up the issue as follows: "Following ISS
constitutes a form of insurance against regulatory criticism, and results in ISS having
a large sway in the affairs of American corporations."1°1
II. The Agency Problem
A. Agency Costs and Corporate Law Myopia
The agency problem arises when one party uses another party to act on his
behalf and the parties' incentives are misaligned. In corporate law the problem of
agency is often expressed as the problem of the separation of ownership and control.
In their seminal piece, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means conceptualized the
shareholders of the corporation as the property "owners" of the corporation and
noted that the corporate form created a separation of ownership and control.10 2
Corporate law scholarship has remained heavily focused on agency problems
created by the separation of ownership and control in the context of the
manager/ shareholder relationship in the "open corporation" .103
The modern corporate landscape is comprised of several layers of agency
relationships, which muddle -the traditional Berle-Means conception of the
corporation. For example, shareholders rely on company management to make
decisions and generate attractive returns; company management relies on third-
party agents such as auditors and lawyers to help them make sound decisions;
individual shareholders rely on institutional clients to invest their money and make
100 See Stout, supra note 10.
101 Leo E. Strine Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New
Challenges We (And Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, at 688.
102 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17.
103 See, e.g., Fama & Jensen, supra note 19.
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financial decisions that impact their future; and institutional clients in turn rely on
agents like ISS to provide proxy voting recommendations and other services.
Despite (i) this transition from the traditional bicameral Berle and Means
agency model to a multicameral model of agency, and (ii) the increasing centrality of
third-party advisors and mutual funds in corporate decision making, very little
scholarship has been dedicated to analyzing the agency costs associated with these
other forms of agency.10 4 The outsourcing of decision-making by mutual funds to ISS
and other proxy advisors presents a rich opportunity to examine the problem of
agency in today's corporate landscape in a more expansive form than originally
conceptualized by Berle and Means.
B. Conceptualizing ISS Agency Cost
1. A Brief Overview of Agency Theory
Leading agency theorists, Professors Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen,
characterize the problem of agency as the problem that arises whenever there is a
"separation of decision and risk bearing functions", l 5 Agency theory holds that the
principal's goals and the agent's incentives do not perfectly align and without
appropriate incentives and restraints the agent could act to the detriment of the
104 Vice Chancellor Strine aptly summed up the issue in a series of articles. Strine
noted that "[a]s much as corporate law scholars fetishize the agency costs that flow from the
separation of ownership and control in operating companies, they have been amazingly quiet
about the 'separation of ownership from ownership."' See Strine, supra note 20, at 6; See also
Strine, supra note 20, at 7 (stating that as much as "the corporate law scholarship of the last 25
years obsesses over the agency costs of operating company boards ... [1]ittle of it considers
that the 'empowerment' of stockholders does not empower end-user investors so much as it
empowers intermediaries.") In another article, Strine further noted that "[tlhese institutional
intermediaries have interests that are not perfectly aligned, to state it mildly, with those of
their own stockholders," and that "these institutions have their own agency costs." See Strine,
infra note 123, at 687. Finally, Strine noted that although much of the focus of corporate
lawyers "remains directed at the management of operating corporations,"... "the traditional
Berle-Means paradigm has fundamentally changed in favor of stockholders." See Strine, supra
note 20, at 8. An example of an exception to the general tendency in the literature to focus on
the agency costs of operating company managers and shareholders, is a research paper by
Larry Ribstein examining the mechanisms utilized by private equity firms to control for
managerial agency costs. See Larry E. Ribstein, Research Papers Series, Uncorporating the Large
Firm, Ill. L. & Econ., Research Paper LE 08-016, (May 28, 2008),
http://papers.ssm.com/pape.tar?abstractid=1138092.
105 Fama & Jensen, supra note 17, at 301.
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principal. Agency theory also recognizes, however, that certain incentives or
restraints help reconcile divergent interests between principal and agent.
In their widely cited work on the problem of agency - Separation of
Ownership and Control - Fama and Jensen note:
Control of agency problems in the decision process is important
when the decision managers who initiate and implement important
decisions are not the major residual claimants and therefore do not
bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions. Without
effective control procedures, such decision managers are more likely
to take actions that deviate from the interests of residual
claimants.106
Fama and Jensen argue that agency problems can be controlled "by decision
systems that separate the management (initiation and implementation) and control
(ratification and monitoring) of important decisions at all levels of the
organization." 10 7 According to Fama and Jensen, "[a]n effective system for decision
control implies, almost by definition, that the control (ratification and monitoring) of
decisions is to some extent separate from the management (initiation and
implementation) of decisions." 10 8
2. Examples of Systems of Decision-Control
In the corporate context, agency costs resulting from the bifurcation of
ownership and control between "managers" (executive officers and corporate
directors) of a corporation on one hand, and the shareholders of a corporation on the
other, are curtailed by a combination of forces, such as express legal rules, "best
practice" type corporate governance norms and standards, market discipline and
fiduciary duties.10 9 Concrete examples of systems of decision control that target the
agency problem in the context of the modem corporation include Sarbanes-Oxley,
106 Fama & Jensen, supra note 17, at 303.
107 Fama & Jensen, supra note 19, at 332.
108 Fama & Jensen, supra note 17, at 303.
109 See generally LEWIS D. SOLOMON, DONALD E. SCHWARTZ, JEFFREY D. BAUMAN &
ELLIOTr J. WEISS, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 36, 658 (Thompson West 1998). See also
ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123-262 (1986) (providing a detailed discussion of the duties
of company officers and directors).
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which emphasizes the need for transparency, CEO pay-tied-to-performance
mechanisms, the use of independent expert boards, a shareholder's right to vote,
fiduciary duties owed by company managers to company shareholders, the stock
market and the takeover market. 1 0
3. Application of Theory to ISS
From an agency theory perspective, ISS presents a lethal combination -
significant power and virtually no accountability. In Fama and Jensen's construct,
the outsourcing of proxy voting and monitoring functions by mutual funds to ISS
presents the classic agency problem of "separation of decision and risk.""' ISS
decides on, and instructs, how mutual funds should vote, but it is the mutual fund
(and ultimately the fund shareholder) that bears the risk of a poor voting decision by
ISS.112
Under classic agency theory, this separation of decision and risk should not
be tolerated without effective control procedures. 113 As Fama and Jensen noted,
"[w]ithout effective control procedures... decision [makers] are more likely to take
actions that deviate from the interests of residual claimants."" 4 [emphasis added]
Mutual funds' primary interest in hiring ISS to monitor corporate ballots and
vote proxies is to receive advice that they can rely on to satisfy their fiduciary
obligations in the most cost effective and efficient manner.1 5 Mutual funds are
required to vote shares held in their portfolio in the "best interest" of their clients.
To satisfy this requirement, the mutual fund must in turn have some system in place
for monitoring companies in which they own stock and for voting this stock in an
informed manner. ISS has become this system. n 6
110 See generally Fama & Jensen, supra note 17 (discussing generally the stock market,
the market for takeovers and the use of expert boards as examples of agency cost control
mechanisms in corporations).
111 Fama & Jensen, supra note 17, at 301.
112 See Strine, supra note 44, at 11 ("[U]nlike the individual investors whose capital
they use to wield influence, institutional investors and their advisors bear far less of the
residual risk of poor voting decisions, as their compensation turns more on short-term factors
than long-term growth.").
113 See generally Fama & Jensen, supra note 17.
114 Id. at 5.
115 See infra Part III.A.1.
116 See Strine, supra note 103 ("Following ISS constitutes a form of insurance against
regulatory criticism, and results in ISS having a large sway in the affairs of American
corporations.")
Vol 14:2
Spring 2009 The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: 407
The Case for Increased Oversight and Control
As a public company, ISS' primary interest in providing proxy voting
services to mutual funds is to maximize profits. While ISS as advisor should
rationally have an interest in ensuring that the advice it provides is consistently
sound, anecdotal evidence suggests otherwise.1 7
How then do we control ISS' agency costs? Are there, in the words of
Professors Fama and Jensen, "effective control procedures" that provide checks on
these agency costs?118 Given that (i) ISS has been entrusted by its institutional clients
to make decisions that have a tremendous effect on corporations and their activities;
and (ii) the market relies on ISS to produce sound corporate governance ratings, a
thorough examination of this question merits attention.
III. The Absence of Agency Cost Control Mechanisms
In Part III, I analyze aspects of the proxy advisory and corporate governance
market, ISS' decision-making methodology, and aspects of its legal obligations and
regulatory environment to make the case that currently no "effective control
procedures" exist that incentivize ISS to provide consistently sound advice and
control its agency costs. First, I examine the market in which ISS operates and I argue
that the market offers weak constraints over ISS agency costs. I posit that this result
is due to the following factors - (i) ISS' mutual fund clients have very little economic
incentive to monitor ISS; (ii) ISS has a "first mover" advantage; and (iii) the proxy
advisory industry has limited competition and high barriers to entry.
Second, I analyze the process through which ISS develops its proxy voting
policies and corporate governance ratings. I argue that this process lacks
transparency and that ISS is not subject to sufficient external procedural checks. The
lack of transparency in ISS' decision-making process results in significant agency
costs as it (i) handicaps a third-party's ability to monitor ISS; (ii) creates a system that
relies on ISS to self-monitor; and (iii) results in a lack of separation of decision-
making from decision-control. The lack of separation of decision-making from
decision-control is sharply at odds with traditional agency theory, particularly when
it is accompanied by a separation of decision and risk, as in ISS' case. 1 9
Third, I highlight that unlike operating company managers, ISS does not
owe fiduciary duties to the companies (or the companies' shareholders) on which ISS
117 See supra notes 92-95.
118 Fama & Jensen, supra note 17, at 301.
119 Fama & Jensen, supra note 17.
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issues proxy advice and corporate governance ratings. 120 I explore the implications
of this and argue that this lack of fiduciary duties furthers the problem of ISS
unaccountability, primarily because ISS bears minimal residual risk of a poor voting
decision vis-A-vis company shareholders. 121
Fourth, I analyze the cumulative effect, from an agency theory perspective,
of inadequate market discipline and the lack of transparency in decision-making
processes, on ISS' accountability. I argue that the combined effect on ISS' clients is a
weakened incentive to utilize "exit" or "voice" as measures to control for agency
costs.
A. Lack of Market Check
The free market can act as a powerful check on agency costs.122 Embedded in
the assumption that markets may serve as a potential check on agency costs is the
assumption that markets are rational and efficient. At a minimum, markets should
be aware of the relevant information needed to make a rational decision and the
market should be pricing this information and corresponding risks appropriately.
For the proxy advisory and corporate governance industry, potential sources
of market check could come from the market for clients, intra-market competition,
and the stock market. So far, however, the proxy advisory and corporate governance
market does not seem to be serving as a robust check on ISS agency costs. The
following sub-section explores possible reasons for this market failure.
1. Market Check from Mutual Fund Clients?
For mutual funds, the most economical and least risky way to demonstrate
compliance with the 2003 SEC Rule is to hire and follow the advice of a proxy
advisor. In terms of monitoring ISS and being active in corporate governance affairs,
mutual funds cannot be expected to serve as a substantial market check on ISS. This
120 For the sake of simplicity, this argument assumes that the operating company
shareholders are direct shareholders in the operating company and not indirect shareholders
through institutional investors, like mutual funds.
121 As a registered investment adviser, ISS does owe fiduciary duties to its mutual
fund clients. See discussion infra Part III.C.
122 See generally Fama & Jensen, supra note 17 (discussing the role of the stock market
and takeover market as examples of agency cost control systems).
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is because mutual funds are generally rationally apathetic and suffer from the classic
free-rider problem. 123
This result is due to the economic realities of mutual funds. First, mutual
funds do not have the necessary internal manpower required to effectively monitor
and vote proxies in the multitude of portfolio companies in which mutual funds own
shares.124 Second, mutual funds generally hold a given stock for a short-period of
time and on average a mutual fund owns less than one percent of a given company's
stock. This in turn means that with the exception of significant events, such as a
merger, mutual funds have very little incentive to expend resources to monitor a
company's day to day activities, and instead find it much more economical to hire a
proxy advisor to do the job.125 Third, because a fund manager is rewarded for the
economic performance of his/her fund and not for making corporate governance
better for the world at large, fund managers have very little immediate economic
incentive to monitor company management and instead find it more efficient (both
economically and logistically) to outsource proxy voting decisions and vote
execution to third-party services like ISS. From the mutual funds' perspective it
makes much more economic and business sense to outsource proxy monitoring and
voting functions to third-party advisor firms like ISS. As Vice Chancellor Strine
noted, "[m]any institutional investors have ... little desire to do any thinking of their
own, particularly about investments that they often hold for nanoseconds." 126
This sentiment was reiterated in a post on CorporateCounsel.net:
123 See Strine, supra note 101, at 687 ("A mutual fund family knows that whatever
benefits its activism generates for the operating company will not be exclusively or primarily
theirs, but will be spread among the operating company's diverse investor base, including the
mutual fund's own industry competitors. For that reason, the huge institutions that manage
an enormous amount of equity for many Americans- like Vanguard, Fidelity, and Barclay's-
have been relatively docile stockholders in the United States.").
124 Broc Romanek, GAO Report on Proxy Advisors: No Smoking Guns, The Harvard
Law School Corp. Gov. Forum, Aug. 3, 2007, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/
2007/08/03/gao-report-on-proxy-advisors-no-smoking-gun ("The reality is that institutional
investors are trying to keep their expense ratio down - and even the larger institutions
typically have only a few employees dedicated to vetting voting issues.").
125 See Strine, supra note 101, at 687 (discussing the fact that "[mlutual funds make
money through fees, and do not have a profit motive to undertake efforts at shareholder
activism at the operating level").
126 Strine, supra note 101, at 688.
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[Mutual funds] hold positions in thousands of companies; it would
be a monumental task to conduct independent research about each
item for each issuer's ballot. To do so, [a mutual fund] would have
to have a staff along the lines of a proxy advisor to adequately do
the job. The reality is that [mutual funds] are trying to keep their
expense ratios down - and even the large [mutual funds] typically
have only a few employees dedicated to vetting voting issues.127
Similarly, the sentiments expressed by the chief operating officer of CPR
Asset Management (CPR-AM), a wholly owned subsidiary of Credit Agricole SA,
further underscore this point: "By using ISS's voting expertise and technologically
advanced platform, we can better exercise our fiduciary responsibilities without
having to add costly internal resources .... [ISS' system] makes it easy to vote. It's a
systematic approach that removes the nightmare of the masses of paper involved in
handling proxies."128
In addition, ISS' mutual fund clients' "Statements of Additional
Information" (SAI)129 show that several mutual funds do indeed adopt a "Follow
ISS" approach as their default. For example, Goldman Sachs' SAI for its "Absolute
Return Tracker Fund" indicates that the fund's proxy voting policy for public equity
investments is "generally to follow the Guidelines and recommendations from
ISS."130 While Goldman's portfolio managers retain the authority to vote differently
from ISS' recommendations, should a manager decide to diverge from ISS'
recommendations, such a decision is subject to an internal "review and approval
process." 131 Similarly, Janus Capital's SAI states that Janus' voting policy is to "vote
all proxies on behalf of client's accounts in accordance with the ISS
127 See, e.g., Romanek, supra note 124.
128 CPR Asset Management selectsInstitutional Shareholder Services for Proxy Voting
solution, Bobsguide, Oct. 14, 2002, available at http://www.bobsguide.com/guide/news/2002
/Oct/14/CPRAssetManagement-selectsInstitutionalShareholderServicesjforProxy_Voti
ngsolution.html.
129 Mutual funds are required to disclose their proxy voting policies in their
Statement of Additional Information (SAI). SAIs can be accessed through the SEC's EDGAR
system or in many cases on a mutual fund's website.
130 See Goldman Sachs Absolute Return Tracker Fund, Statement of Additional
Information, at B-48, May 23, 2008, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/client-services/
assetmanagement/mutual-funds/u-sfunds/pdf/prospectuses/newfunds/SAIARTInst
_AC.pdf.
131 Id.
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Recommendations ... unless otherwise directed by the client." 132 Finally, Oberweis
Funds' proxy voting policy states that "[i]n general, based on [our] review of [ISS']
proxy voting recommendations, it is anticipated that [we] will be in agreement with
[ISS] recommendations and no other action will be required by [us]." 133
The economics of the relationship between ISS and mutual funds provide no
real incentives for the funds or ISS to control and resolve any agency cost problems
that may exist. In fact, one may argue that this result is necessitated by a mutual
fund's guiding principle to act in the "best interest" of its clients, which dictates that
a mutual fund focus its energies and resources on maximizing fund profits and
minimizing fund losses, not on corporate ballot monitoring and proxy voting
execution. At base, the reality is that for mutual funds proxy issues are often just a
function of timing rather than conviction.
2. Market Check from Intra-Market Competition?
ISS is the dominant player in the proxy advisory and corporate governance
industry.M The industry is characterized by a limited number of players and ISS
currently operates without significant competitive pressure. 135 Even though Glass
Lewis has made some inroads into ISS' market share, the current gap between ISS'
and Glass Lewis' proxy coverage makes it unlikely that Glass Lewis will pose a
significant threat to ISS' market share in the near future.136
The anemic level of competition currently present in the proxy advisory and
corporate governance industry is not sufficient to serve as an adequate check on ISS
agency costs. A key reason for this lack of competition is that ISS has been able to
successfully cement its position in the market as the first player in town and, as a
result, has reaped significant benefits (the so-called "first mover advantage"). A
second reason, which is intimately tied to the first, is that the proxy advisory and
corporate governance industry has significant barriers to entry.
a. "First Mover" Advantage
132 See Janus Investment Fund, Janus Equity and Bond Funds, Statement of Additional
Information, at 81 Feb. 28, 2008, available at http://www.janus.com.
133 See Oberweis Funds, Proxy Vote Policies and Procedures, available at
http://www.oberweisfunds.com/account-services.asp?page=proxyvote.
134 See U.S. GOVIT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4.
135 See, U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4.
136 See Part I.C.1 supra (discussing the current gap in proxy coverage between ISS and
Glass-Lewis).
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ISS has what economists and marketers term a "first mover" advantage. First
mover advantage theory states that first movers into a new industry will gain an
advantage, creating very high or insurmountable barriers for new entrants.137
Professors Lieberman's and Montgomery's 1998 seminal paper on the topic of first
mover advantage provides a helpful conceptual framework for examining the first
mover advantage of ISS.138 Lieberman and Montgomery attribute the advantages of
being a first-mover to the following: (i) network effects; (ii) consumer switching
costs; (iii) acquisition of resources; and (iv) technology preemption.139
i. Network Effects
Network effects are typically more important in industries where technology
plays a central role.1 40 Network effects apply to industries where the value of a good
or service to a given user increases with the number of users. According to Professor
Lieberman, "[t]he positive feedback that is generated causes the market to tip in
favor of the firm that emerges as the standard, potentially leading to a winner-take-
all market structure... In markets with network effects, the leading firm is likely to
capture disproportionate returns." 141
A classic example of a network effect is the adoption of the "QWERTY"
keyboard as the industry standard in the telecommunications industry. The initial
adoption of the QWERTY keyboard eventually lead to widespread adoption of this
configuration. Manufacturers were keen to produce keyboards with the
configuration that was more popularly known and users wanted to learn to type on
137 See generally Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover
Advantages, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J., (SPECIAL ISSUE: STRATEGY CONTENT RESEARCH) 41
(Summer 1988); Roger A. Kerin, P. Rajan Varadarajan & Robert A. Peterson, First-Mover
Advantage: A Synthesis, Conceptual Framework, and Research Propositions, 56 J. Marketing 33
(1992); Gurumurthy Kalyanaram, William Robinson & Glen Urban, Order of Market Entry:
Established Empirical Generalizations, Emerging Empirical Generalizations, and Future Research, 14
MARKETING SCI. G212 (1995); David Szymanski, Lisa Troy & Sundar Bharadwaj, Order of
Entry and Business Performance: An Empirical Synthesis and Reexamination, 59J. Marketing 17
(1995); Pieter VanderWerf & John. F. Mahon, Meta-Analysis of the Impact of Research Methods on
Findings of First-Mover Advantage, 43 Mgmt. Sci. 1510 (1997).
138 See Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 137.
139 Id. See also Marvin B. Lieberman, Did First-Mover Advantage Survive the Dot-Coin
Crash?, Dec. 2007, available at http://www.smith.umd.edu/seminars/Papers/Lieberman-
InternetFirstMoverAdvantages.pdf (describing the types of mechanisms that help sustain a
first-mover advantage).
140 Id.
141 Id. at 8.
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the configuration which was more popularly produced. By the time alternative
keyboard configurations emerged, QWERTY had already achieved market
dominance and was embedded in the collective psyche of consumers. QWERTY still
remains the standard today.
ISS is unquestionably the leading firm in the proxy advisory industry, and
the industry exhibits network effects from which ISS has reaped the benefits. On the
institutional client side, the more mutual funds that use ISS' services, the more a
mutual fund can feel secure in relying on ISS' advice because it is assured that its
voting practices are in line with the industry.142 Similarly on the operating company
side, the more institutional investors vote according to ISS recommendations, the
more it behooves companies to ensure that they fall in line with ISS' CGQ ratings,
and the best way to achieve this is to hire ISS for its corporate governance expertise.
ISS was able to effectively dominate the proxy advisory and corporate governance
market early on and it continues to benefit from significant network effects that
reinforce its prominence in the industry.
ii. Consumer Switching Costs
The economic and psychological costs to consumers of switching brands
may benefit a first mover if the first mover is able to effectively capture market share
early on.143 If a consumer has made a substantial investment in a product, by the
time a late mover enters the market, the late mover will have to expend more
resources than the first mover and offer a superior product in order to compel the
consumer to switch brands.
As the first mover in the proxy advisory industry, ISS benefits handsomely
from consumer switching costs. In terms of the proxy advisory industry, the costs of
switching proxy advisors entail the hassle of getting up to speed with a new rating
and proxy voting system, and the immense task of switching voting platforms. As
noted by the founder of CorporateCounsel.net, "[n]o sane institutional investor is
going to assume the risk inherent in moving thousands of accounts and ballots from
ISS to another provider. The chance that accounts would be lost, not voted, or voted
incorrectly is far too great. An ISS competitor has a rough road ahead to try to
142 See Strine, supra note 101, at 688 ("Following ISS constitutes a form of insurance
against regulatory criticism, and results in ISS having a large sway in the affairs of American
corporations.").
143 See Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 137.
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duplicate the sophisticated vote execution platform that ISS has built over the
years."144 Similarly, the GAO Report noted that "[sleveral of the institutional
investors [the GAO] spoke with that subscribe to ISS's services explained that they
do so because they have relied on ISS for many years and trust it to provide reliable,
efficient services." 145
iii. Acquisition of Resources and Assets
A first-mover may also gain an advantage by establishing positions in
geographic or product space such that new entrants find it unprofitable to enter the
market - the theory of spatial preemption.146 Generally, a given market will only
have space for a limited number of profitable firms.147 A first-mover can acquire an
advantage by selecting the most attractive niches and by employing strategies that
limit the amount of space remaining for subsequent entrants. 148 Spatial preemption
may include the preemption of both geographic space and "shelf" space, which
allows for brand positioning in the eyes of consumers.149
ISS has unquestionably been able to acquire prime shelf space and has
created a premier brand. Twenty-four of the top 25 institutional investors use ISS,
ISS advises funds controlling approximately half the world's common stock and ISS
is commonly referred to as, and acknowledged to be, the industry leader. 50
iv. Technology Preemption
Early product development and knowledge creation often means that the
first mover will have the first bite at obtaining intellectual property protection for its
144 Broc Romanek, GAO Report on Proxy Advisors: No Smoking Guns,
TheCorporateCounsel.net Blog, Aug. 1, 2007, http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/
blog/archive/001460.html (discussing that even though the GAO Report found that ISS
adequately disclosed potential conflicts, the report was deficient in a number of ways,
including that the report underestimated ISS' influence).
145 U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4, at 13.
146 See Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 137. See also Edward C. Prescott &
Michael Visscher, Sequential Location Among Firms with Foresight, 8 BELL J. ECON. 378 (1977);
Ram C. Rao and David P. Rutenberg, Pre-empting An Alert Rival: Strategic Timing of the First
Plant by Analysis of Sophisticated Rival, 10 BELL J. ECON. 412 (1979); B. Curtis Eaton and Richard
G. Lipsey, Capital Commitment and Entry Equilibrium, 12 BELL J. ECON. 593 (1981).
147 See Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 137.
148 See Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 137
149 See Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 137.
150 See Part 1.2., supra (discussing ISS' business and market share).
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creations.151 ISS has been successful in developing and acquiring proprietary
platforms, such as the Governance Analytics platform and the Straight-Through-
Processing System, 5 2 which allow ISS to offer superior coverage of ballots and vote
execution capabilities.
ISS has a clear first mover advantage. For mutual funds, for whom it makes
more economic sense to outsource proxy voting services and not actively monitor,
ISS' first mover advantage points strongly in favor of a mutual fund choosing ISS.
The lack of competition and high barriers to entry in the proxy advisory industry
continue to entrench ISS' first mover advantage and result in a weak market check
on ISS' agency costs. In addition, ISS has not fallen prey to what Lieberman and
Montgomery term the first mover disadvantage, which typically results from an
inability by a first mover to maintain continued mastery and dominance of a given
product space.153 First mover disadvantages include shifts in technological or
consumer needs, incumbent inertia, resolution of technological or market
uncertainty in favor of a competitor's product, and free-rider effects.154 ISS
continuously revamps its products to match its client's needs, it enjoys a high
renewal rate, and it continues to attract new clients.
b. Lack of Competition and Significant Barriers to Entry
Limited competition and high barriers to entry in the proxy advisory
industry allow ISS to maintain its first mover advantage and continue to operate
with little pressure to control potential agency costs. 155
The GAO Report identifies the ability to offer "comprehensive coverage of
corporate proxies" and to "implement sophisticated technologies" as the main
barriers to entry in the proxy advisory industry.156 In addition, the presence of
151 See Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 137.
152 The "Straight Through Processing" system is the proprietary platform that ISS
uses for vote execution. See infra notes 157 and 161.
153 See Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover (Dis)Advantages:
Retrospective and Link With The Resource-Based View, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1111 (1998).
154 Id.
155 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4 (ISS is the dominant player in
the advisory industry with over 1,700 clients, which is more than the other four major proxy
advisors combined). See also 2007 Annual Report, supra note 8, at 17 ("[tlhe competitive
landscape for multi-asset class risk management and corporate governance and financial
research and analysis products and services is characterized by a limited number of external
third party competitors." [emphasis added]).
156 U.S. GOV'T AccOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4, at 13.
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switching costs associated with vote execution also presents an additional barrier to
entry in the proxy advisory industry.
i. Comprehensive Coverage as a Barrier
Any firm wishing to effectively compete with ISS for its proxy advice and
corporate governance business would have to at a minimum offer the same scope of
coverage as ISS. Considering that ISS offers coverage "for more than 45,000
shareholder meetings across 110 countries," 157 this is no small feat. As previously
discussed, ISS has a first mover advantage in developing products and is much
further along the learning curve than its competitors. Institutional clients will incur
significant economic and psychological switching costs should they decide to switch
proxy advisors. Merely providing the same coverage as ISS may not be enough to
attract clients. Instead any new entrant would have to offer coverage that exceeds ISS'
or be able to offer a superior product in terms of other attributes, such as price or
improved decision-making methodologies.
Furthermore, while much of the information that is needed to provide
"coverage" is public, it is the gathering and processing of this information that poses
the real barrier. Much of this gathering and processing function rests on the
sophistication and capabilities of the underlying technology.
ii. Sophisticated Technology as a Barrier
According to the GAO Report, "[tihe initial investment required to develop
and implement [the needed] technology can be a significant expense .. ."158 In
addition, the GAO Report notes that developing and implementing the necessary
technology to provide research and voting services can be "challenging." 15 9
According to the GAO Report, however, "once a firm has done so, the marginal cost
of providing services to additional clients and of updating and maintaining such
technology is relatively low." 160
The development, implementation, updating and maintenance of the
technology necessary to effectively compete in the proxy advisor industry is in the
aggregate a significant barrier to entry, which limits competition and preserves ISS'
first mover advantage.
157 See 2008 Annual Report, supra note 7, at 11.
158 U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4, at 14.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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iii. Vote Execution Switching Costs
Another barrier to entry that has been identified in the proxy advisor
industry is the switching cost associated with vote execution. ISS utilizes a "Straight
Through Processing System" (STP) for vote execution of U.S. and global ballots.161
According to ISS, the STP "allows for ballots to be received and proxy votes to be
made electronically, minimizing the manual aspects of the proxy voting process and
limiting the risk of error inherent in manual processes." 162 Being able to provide
efficient and reliable vote execution lessens an institutional client's need to be
involved in the process.
The lack of competitive vigor in the proxy advisory industry shows no signs
of being alleviated and the current economics of the industry are not enough to
control for ISS agency costs. Despite persistent concerns about the quality and
reliability of ISS' recommendations and ratings, ISS has seen relatively little
defection from its institutional clients.163
3. Market Check from Stock Markets?
In January 2008, ISS' parent, RiskMetrics became a public company, and its
stock is traded on the New York Stock Exchange. As is the case with any publicly
traded company, investors are now able to use the stock market as a direct way of
rewarding or disciplining RiskMetrics for its actions and decisions. 164 For example,
when Moody's Investor Service came under fire in 2008 for errors in its ratings of
161 According to the 2007 Annual Report, ISS administers the STP through an
arrangement it has with Broadridge. See 2007 Annual Report, supra note 8.
162 2007 Annual Report, supra note 8, at 10.
163 One notable exception to the unwillingness of institutional clients to switch from
ISS to an ISS competitor is the Colorado Public Employees' Retirement Association
("CPERA"). In November 2006, after 16 years of using ISS, CPERA terminated its contract
with ISS and hired Glass-Lewis. See Starkman, supra note 78. However, this is the exception to
the rule. In 2006, ISS' president and chief executive noted that "despite 30 defections, ISS had
a 94 percent renewal rate by its customers [in 2005] and added 424 [new] clients." See
Starkman, supra note 78. See also 2008 Annual Report, supra note 7, at 3 ("[Dluring the year
ended December 31, 2008, [ISS] had a renewal rate of approximately 86.3%.").
164 As a result of RiskMetrics becoming a public company, RiskMetrics is now subject
to the SEC's disclosure rules, which will allow for enhanced transparency of its operations. ISS
is also subject to other regulations, such as the insider trading prohibitions, the general anti-
fraud prohibitions, and the Investment Adviser Act. However, like the reporting and
disclosure obligations, it is doubtful that these regulations will result in increased
transparency in ISS decision methodology, which is a key part of the ISS agency cost problem.
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complex debt instruments, the market responded by registering a 16% drop in
Moody's share price.165
While market discipline of RiskMetrics could reduce some ISS agency costs,
it is questionable whether stock price discipline directed at ISS' parent will in turn
serve as an effective control device that targets ISS agency costs. ISS has already
established itself as the market leader and during the critical period when ISS
cemented its first-mover advantage,166 ISS was not subject to market discipline vis-A-
vis a public stock price. On the other hand, because ISS accounts for approximately
50% of RiskMetrics' earnings, 167 widespread concerns by the market about errors in
ISS' judgment, ratings or advice may result in a sell off of RiskMetric stock.
Currently, it is hard to predict whether the market for RiskMetrics stock will
emerge as a meaningful check on ISS agency costs. At present, however, stock
market discipline of ISS does not act as a significant check on ISS agency costs.
B. Lack of Transparency & Controls in Decision-Making Process
Transparency is recognized as a critical component of sound corporate
governance. 168 In the wake of recent corporate malfeasance, there has been an
increased focus on enhanced transparency as a way to control for agency costs. For
example, Sarbanes-Oxley aims to increase accurate and timely disclosure; the OECD
Principles of Corporate Governance call for the "timely and accurate disclosure...
[of] all material matters regarding the corporation," 169 SEC's Regulation FD aims to
correct information asymmetry and requires registered public companies to
disseminate information to all constituents simultaneously; 7 0 and the Business
165 See Aaron Lucchetti & Kara Scannell, New Debt Products Test Moody's Method,
WALL ST. J., May 22, 2008, at 2.
166 See Part III.A.2.a. for a discussion of ISS' first mover advantage.
167 This is based on RiskMetrics' and ISS' "Earnings Before Interest Tax Depreciation
and Amortization" for the year ended December 31, 2008, as reported on RiskMetrics' Form
10-K for the year ended December 31, 2008. See supra note 7.
168 See Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 22; ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004), OECD Publication
Service, 2 Rue Andre-Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex, 16, France [hereinafter OECD Principles];
Business Round Table, Principles of Corporate Governance, (white paper, Nov. 2005) available at
http://www.businessroundtable.org/initiatives/leadership/govemance (follow "Principles
of Corporate Governance" hyperlink to download pdf).
169 See OECD Principles, supra note 168, at 22.
170 SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100-03 (2000).
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Roundtable directs companies to consider the need for candor and timely disclosure
in their communications with stockholders and other investors.1 71
Transparency offers an effective way to control agency costs because it
incentivizes the agent to control its agency costs and it places the principal in a better
position to monitor and exert control over the agent's actions. Lack of transparency
enables the agent to act without fear of public sanction, increases the risk of residual
loss to the principal, provides fertile ground for opportunistic and self-regarding
behavior, results in information asymmetry, creates opportunity for the agent to
make decisions based on unfounded assumptions and/or unprincipled arguments,
and limits the principal's ability to monitor the agent.172
ISS strives to achieve transparency in the development of its proxy voting
policies by soliciting input from its institutional clients and providing an
opportunity for clients to comment on proposed proxy voting policies before they
are implemented. 173 Although the development of its proxy voting policies is not
opaque, precisely how those policies are implemented remains unclear.17 4 Even more
unclear is how ISS determines a company's CGQ score. Because the CGQ is
comprised of proprietary variables, and the methodologies, assumptions and totality
of qualitative factors that are determinative of a company's CGQ score are all
unknown, in the area of corporate governance ratings ISS operates in a black hole
free from market or regulatory check. 175
From an agency theory perspective, the lack of transparency in the
implementation of ISS' proxy voting policies and, in particular, in the generation of
its corporate governance ratings is unsettling for several reasons. First, without
transparency, third parties are unable to adequately monitor ISS. Second, this creates
a de facto regime in which ISS is left to self-monitor, even though ISS has no real
171 See Bus. Roundtable, supra note 168, at 32-33.
172 See, e.g., Note, Mechanisms of Secrecy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1556 (2008) (discussin.g the
interplay among secrecy, transparency and agency costs).
173 See RiskMetrics Policy Gateway, available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/policy
(last visited, Apr. 3, 2009).
174 A December 2008 memorandum published by the law firm of Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz referenced this broader point in its discussion of how ISS would implement its
new proxy voting policies regarding executive compensation practices, with a focus on what
ISS refers to as "poor pay practices." The memorandum noted that "[c]ircumstances under
which one or more 'poor pay practices' will trigger a withhold recommendation remain
unclear, and likely will be determined by [ISS] on a case-by-case basis." See Katz & McIntosh,
supra note 86.
175 See supra Part I, (discussing generally the opaque nature of the CGQ).
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incentive to aggressively control for potential agency costs. Third, acceptance of a
system which permits ISS to decide how voting policies should be implemented and
corporate governance ratings determined without simultaneous checks ex ante to
control for decision missteps, presents the classic Fama and Jensen agency problem
of "the lack of separation of decision-making from decision control."176
1. External Monitoring Handicap
The lack of transparency in ISS' decision-making process significantly
hampers any attempt by mutual funds or the market to monitor ISS' methodologies
and resulting advice. A principal's ability to monitor the agent is generally
recognized as a powerful way to curtail agency costs.177 For ISS' clients any attempt
to monitor the substance of and process by which ISS reaches decisions is
significantly handicapped by the inability to obtain all relevant information.
Similarly, while the market is generally regarded as an effective monitoring tool that
can help reduce agency costs, 178 in ISS' case the market's ability to monitor is also
significantly compromised because ISS' decisions are cloaked in a veil of secrecy. 179
2. Reliance on ISS to Self-Monitor
The secret nature of ISS' decision-making process provides no incentive for
ISS to correct any deficiencies in its analysis and resulting advice. In fact it does just
the opposite -it provides a black box into which ISS can disappear to perform its
decision-making and from which it can emerge with decisions in the form of CGQ
scores that are essentially immune from scrutiny.
No one except ISS knows precisely how the CGQ score is derived and no
one except ISS can ensure that the CGQ score serves its intended purpose of
providing an accurate measure of a company's corporate governance. The quality of
the CGQ is dependent on the trustworthiness of ISS to objectively do its job.180 To
trust the CGQ one must trust that when faced with the temptation of pursuing its
interest over those of its clients, ISS will always act selflessly and put the best interest
176 See supra Part II, (discussing generally the deficiencies that arise from lack of
separation of decision making from decision control).
177 Id.
178 See Part II, supra (discussing market discipline as a measure for controlling agency
costs).
179 See Part I.C.2., supra.
1SO Id.
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of its clients first. In contrast, the anecdotal evidence suggests that there is good
reason to doubt whether ISS is a reliable self-monitor.181 Furthermore, as argued
above, the economics of ISS' relationship with its mutual fund clients and the lack of
competition in the proxy advisory industry do not adequately incentivize ISS to
aggressively self-monitor its decision-making process.
3. Centralization of Decision-Making and Decision-Control
The secret nature of ISS' decision process significantly handicaps the ability
of mutual fund clients and the market to monitor ISS' decisions, which by extension
leaves ISS as the de facto monitor. In the Fama-Jensen paradigm, ISS' decision system
combines "decision management" and "decision control" in the hands of the
agent.182
A combination of "decision management" and "decision control" is not by
itself offensive to agency theory, however, agency concerns are at their height when
both functions are centralized in the hands of an agent. Agency theory tempers this
problem by instructing that the agent bears a commensurate amount of residual
risk.183 ISS, however, bears relatively little residual risk of issuing poor voting
advice.18 4
4. Contrast to Other Policy Makers
ISS is arguably one of the most influential policy makers in the corporate
governance space.185 Unlike other policy makers such as the SEC and NYSE, who are
constrained in their policy making by various procedural checks and balances, ISS is
free to produce its policies carte blanche. For example, the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) and its companion rule-making procedures establish standards for the
SEC's decisions and provide a point of reference for SEC decision-monitoring by
181 See Part I.C.2., supra.
182 Fama & Jensen, supra note 17.
183 Id. at 7 ("A feasible solution to the agency problem that arises when the same
agents manage and control important decisions is to restrict residual claims to the important
decision agents. In effect, restriction of residual claims to decision agents substitutes for costly
control devices to limit the discretion of decision agents.").
184 See Part II, supra. See also Strine, supra note 44, at 11 ("[Ulnlike the individual
investors whose capital they use to wield influence, institutional investors and their advisors
bear far less of the residual risk of poor voting decisions, as their compensation turns more on
short-term factors than long-term growth.").
185 See Rose, supra note 28 (discussing ISS' role as policy maker in setting corporate
governance standards). See also text accompanying supra note 11.
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third parties.186 Similarly, the NYSE is constrained by external controls on its rule-
making process in the form of Section 19(b)1 of the United States Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act")187 and corresponding Rule 19b-4,188 which requires
the NYSE to file a notice of any proposed rule change with the SEC. The SEC and
NYSE rule-making procedural requirements all are meant to encourage transparency
in the decision-making process and to engender well thought out and principled
policies. In contrast, ISS' decisions and resulting policy and advice are not curtailed
by any similar procedural checks. Thus, although ISS advises institutional clients
that manage the largest share of the world's equity, ISS is not subject to similar
external procedural checks on its decision making. The absence of similar procedural
checks provides yet another example of a systematic deficiency in monitoring and
controlling ISS agency costs. 189
C. Lack of Fiduciary Duties Restraints
Although ISS has significant sway over the affairs of corporations, unlike
corporate managers, it does not owe fiduciary duties to the corporations (or the
corporations' stockholders) on which it makes recommendations that have been
estimated to sway up to 20% of shareholder votes. 90
For corporate managers, the fiduciary duty of care and the duty of loyalty
are meant to restrain company managers from abusing their position as decision-
makers and overseers of the corporation's affairs. In contrast, ISS is free from such
fiduciary restraints and is free to advance recommendations, which may or may not
be in the best interest of the corporations, with minimal risk of repercussion should
its recommendations prove wrong. Vice Chancellor Strine acknowledged this
disconnect, stating:
186 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
187 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-lll.
188 17 C.F.R. 240.19b-4 (2008).
189 While it is acknowledged that ISS is a private entity and thus should be treated
differently than a public administrative agency, in the corporate governance space, ISS is an
influential policy maker and corresponding restraints should attach. See supra note 185.
190 See Bethel & Gillan, supra note 12. See also Strine, supra note 101, at 688 ("Following
ISS constitutes a form of insurance against regulatory criticism, and results in ISS having a
large sway in the affairs of American corporations."). Contra Stephen J. Choi et al., Director
Elections and the Influence of Proxy Advisors 52 (NYU Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Working
Paper No. 08-22, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=223729 (arguing that ISS'
influence is overstated).
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Unlike corporate managers, neither institutional investors, as
stockholders, nor ISS, as a voting advisor, owe fiduciary duties to
the corporations whose policies they seek to influence. And unlike
the individual investors whose capital they use to wield influence,
institutional investors and [ISS] bear far less of the residual risk of
poor voting decisions, as their compensation turns more on short-
term factors than long-run growth. 91
The trend of substituting ISS' recommendations for those of company
managers means that mutual funds are replacing agents who are constrained by
relatively strong fiduciary duties with agents who have relatively weak fiduciary
duties.
1. Traditional Fiduciary Duties of Operating Company Managers
Company managers owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the
corporation and its shareholders.192 Taken together, the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty provide incentives and restraints to curtail agency problems created by the
separation of ownership from control between managers and shareholders.
The duty of loyalty addresses the heart of the agency problem: the
divergence of interests between the principal and the agent, looking both to
substance and procedure. The duty of loyalty requires corporate officers and
directors to act only in the best interests of the shareholders with potentially serious
legal consequences if a court finds that the duty has been breached. Both in theory
and in fact, the duty of loyalty provides incentives and restraints on corporate
managers that address problems of agency.
The duty of care lends support to the duty of loyalty by providing restraints
against grossly negligent acts by managers of a corporation. The duty of care
incentivizes management to establish decision control systems ex ante to guard
against claims of a breach. In addition, the duty of care provides a normative
framework for addressing agency problems related both to the substance of
management's decisions and the process from which these decisions derived. Also,
because as a practical matter courts often blur the distinction between the duty of
191 Strine, supra note 44, at 11.
192 See generally SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 109. See also CLARK, supra note 109.
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care and the duty of loyalty, together both fiduciary duties address managerial
agency costs whether or not they stem from a conflict of interests.19
3
Together, the managerial fiduciary duties of care and loyalty (i) reach a wide
range of (mis)conduct, (ii) are aimed at addressing both problems in the substance of
the decision and the process by which the decision was made, (iii) incentivize
managers to establish ex ante monitoring systems, information systems and decision
control systems that target a wide range of ills, (iv) provide a best practice
framework within which managers are expected to operate and (v) provide a
framework for courts to assess whether managers have held up their end of the
bargain or exploited their positions as agents.
In contrast to the fiduciary duty checks on agency costs to which company
managers are subject, ISS is free to make decisions that could potentially affect
corporate vote outcomes without fiduciary duty restraint.
2. ISS' Fiduciary Duties under the Adviser Act
As an investment adviser under the Investment Adviser Act of 1940
(Advisor Act),194 ISS does owe fiduciary duties to its mutual fund clients.195 These
fiduciary duties have been articulated as a requirement that advisers act in the best
interest of their clients by fully disclosing all potential conflicts of interest. In SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that the
Adviser Act imposes a fiduciary duty on investment advisers to act in the best
interest of their clients by fully disclosing all potential conflicts of interest. 196 The
Court noted that advisers have a duty of utmost good faith and are required to
provide full and fair disclosure of all material facts. The Court also noted that in
enacting these provisions Congress intended to "eliminate, or at least to expose, all
conflicts of interest which might incline an investment adviser -consciously or
unconsciously -to render advice which was not disinterested." 197 The SEC has
193 See, e.g., SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 109, at 658 (stating that historically the duty
of care and the duty of loyalty were thought to be "discrete and separate," but recently courts
"have begun to blur the distinction between the two so that it is sometimes difficult to tell
when one duty ends and another duty begins").
194 The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. (2006).
195 See TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS, MUTUAL FUNDS AND
ADVISERS, (2nd Ed., Aspen Law & Business) (providing an overview of the fiduciary duties of
investment advisers).
196 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
197 Id. at 191-92.
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consistently confirmed the Supreme Court's articulation of an adviser's fiduciary
duty in no-action letters.198
ISS' fiduciary duties under the Adviser Act do not, however, extend to the
corporations or the shareholders of the corporations that are affected by its decisions
and advice.
D. Between a Rock and a Hard Place - Weakened Exit; Diluted Voice; Historic
Loyalty
The twin strategies of "exit" and "voice" operate in tandem to incentivize
agents to act in the best interests of the principal, and are powerful monitoring and
sanctioning devices that target agency costs.199 "Exit" refers to a person's ability to
sever his or her ties with an organization with whom that person is dissatisfied. In
the context of the publicly traded company, the sale of stock is the chief form of exit.
"Voice" refers to a person's ability to remain with the organization and attempt to
remedy the situation creating the dissatisfaction. The right to vote afforded common
stock is an example of voice in the corporate context. One's willingness to exit or
voice often depends on the strength of one's loyalty to the organization.
The extent to which a principal can readily employ exit and/or voice in
signaling dissatisfaction to an agent impacts the relevance of exit and voice as
monitoring and sanctioning tools. In ISS' case, the combination of weak market
constraints and the lack of decision process transparency, results in a dual
weakening of exit and voice for mutual fund clients.
1. Weakened Exit
Holders of a corporation's common stock are generally free to sell their stock
without management's concurrence or involvement and with relatively little
hassle.200 The ability to freely transfer stock provides an economic source of
constraint on management's discretion and it provides the basis for a functioning
takeover market.20 1 In addition, the more liquid the market for a corporation's
common stock, the easier it should be for a shareholder to employ a strategy of exit.
198 See, e.g., Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note
87.
199 See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 27.
200 This assumes that the common stock is unrestricted and not subject to transfer
restrictions, as is the case with most publicly held common stock.
201 See SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 109.
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In contrast, a dissatisfied ISS mutual fund client who wants to employ a
strategy of exit is constrained by, inter alia, switching costs, the lack of vigorous
competition and by the need to involve ISS in transferring proxy voting data from its
voting platform to that of an ISS competitor.2 2 Unlike stock which is a relatively
liquid investment for common shareholders, the employment of ISS is a highly
illiquid investment for ISS' mutual fund clients. Thus, although exit is generally
thought to provide a powerful monitoring and sanctioning device, in the case of ISS,
exit poses significant costs to a mutual fund, which in turn weakens its efficiency as
an agency cost control tool.
2. Diluted Voice
Stockholders of a corporation may express dissatisfaction with company
management in several ways, such as by exercising their right to vote, by presenting
proposals for inclusion in a company's proxy, or by meeting with management to
voice concerns. 20 3 A stockholder's willingness to use his or her voice is contingent on
the stockholder's estimate of success. Even if a stockholder ultimately decides not to
voice dissatisfaction, the stockholder may still utilize exit as a way to signal
disapproval and sanction management.
In contrast, ISS' clients face significant obstacles in employing an "exit"
strategy, making exit an unrealistic tool for monitoring and sanctioning ISS for
agency missteps. In addition, voice is also an unrealistic sanctioning tool for ISS'
mutual fund clients because mutual funds typically own a de minimis amount of any
company's stock and have very little incentive to expend resources to exercise voice.
Furthermore, while a dissatisfied stockholder who may also be rationally apathetic
and not incentivized to employ a strategy of voice may instead readily employ a
strategy of exit, because exit poses significant costs for a mutual fund client they are
left between a rock and a hard place. Mutual funds have little incentive to actively
monitor and voice concerns, and they will be hard pressed to undertake a strategy of
exit barring exigent circumstances.
202 See Part III.2.a. and Part III.2.b. supra for a discussion of switching costs and the
lack of competition in the proxy advisory and corporate governance industry.
203 A recent example of the exercise of voice is the campaign by members of the
Rockefeller family to pressure executives at Exxon to change aspects of Exxon's business
strategy. See Leslie Eaton and Russell Gold, Rockefeller Rebellion Turns Up Heat on Exxon, WALL
ST. J., May 24, 2008, at A12.
Vol114:2
Spring 2009 The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: 427
The Case for Increased Oversight and Control
3. Historic Loyalty
The choice between exit and voice may also be influenced by the intangible
factor of loyalty.2 4 The more attached a person is to an organization, all things
remaining equal, the more reluctant he or she will be to sever ties with the
organization by employing a strategy of exit.
ISS has a first-mover advantage and enjoys historic brand loyalty, which
shows no signs of eroding.205 This suggests that ISS clients would favor a strategy of
voice over exit. Because ISS' clients are rationally apathetic, however, it is unrealistic
to expect them to expend the necessary resources to effectively monitor ISS and
control for agency costs, and the more realistic expectation is that mutual funds will
not do anything absent a seismic shift in the status quo.
IV. Potential Arguments in Favor of the Status Quo
Having outlined the agency costs of ISS and, to a large extent the proxy
advisory industry and corporate governance rating industry, as well as why ISS has
no real incentives or restraints that ensure that these agency costs are controlled, Part
IV addresses the primary objections likely to be raised in response to this article.
First, some may argue that ISS' influence is overstated and that currently there is no
need to expend resources to address any potential agency costs. Second, because ISS'
institutional clients are theoretically free to vote the underlying shares in their
portfolio however they see fit, it may be argued that this controls for agency costs
and that there is no need to implement additional monitoring devices. A third
potential critique is that ISS is constrained by reputational risk and other market
forces, which minimizes the need for additional monitoring strictures.
A. ISS' Influence is Overstated
The urgency one attaches to controlling for ISS agency costs may be tied to
the degree of influence that one perceives ISS to have. For example, in a 2008
204 See generally HIRSCHMAN, supra note 27.
205 The historic brand loyalty that ISS enjoys is intimately linked to its first mover
advantage. See generally Section III.A.2.a., supra (discussing ISS' first mover advantage). See also
text accompanying supra note 145 ("...the GAO Report noted that '[s]everal of the institutional
investors [the GAO] spoke with that subscribe to ISS' services explained that they do so
because they have relied on ISS for many years and trust it to provide reliable, efficient
services'.").
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working paper Professors Choi, Fisch and Kahan argue that "the reported influence
of ISS is substantially overstated [and]... that proxy advisors act primarily as agents
or intermediaries which aggregate information that investors find important in
determining how to vote in director elections rather than as independent power
centers." 2 6 In conducting their study, Professors Choi, Fisch and Kahan used a data
set of proxy recommendations and voting results for uncontested director elections
from 2005 and 2006 at S&P 1500 companies, with the aim of examining inter alia how
proxy advisors' recommendations affect shareholder vote. After performing various
analyses, they concluded that while there is some correlation between ISS'
recommendations and how shareholders vote, the correlation is not as strong as one
would expect to see given ISS' perceived role of "exercising 'tremendous clout,'
wielding 'extraordinary' influence, [and] getting 'whatever [it] wants' ... "207
The Choi/ Fisch/ Kahan study is valuable in attempting to quantify ISS'
influence; however, the study does not deny that ISS has influence and it does not
address the agency costs that this influence comes with, which is the focus of this
article. In fact Choi/Fisch/Kahan note that proxy advisor firms "follow significantly
different factors in determining their recommendations" and that "[t]hese
differences may support increased disclosure by proxy advisors in their approach...
" This sentiment is in keeping with this article's call for increased transparency in
ISS' decision-making process, which would be an important step towards controlling
ISS agency costs.
Furthermore, while ISS may not be an "independent power center," the
anecdotal evidence suggests that institutional investors and corporations do ascribe
significant weight to its recommendations. For example, Vice Chancellor Strine's
perception is that:
ISS [has] a large sway in the affairs of American corporations. Moreover,
powerful CEOs come on bended knee to Rockville, Maryland, where ISS
resides, to persuade the managers of ISS of the merits of their views ....
They do so because the CEOs recognize that some institutional investors will
simply follow ISS's advice rather than do any thinking of their own. 208
206 See Choi et al., supra note 190.
207 Id. at 4.
208 See Strine, supra note 101, at 688.
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Similarly, according to the former General Counsel of CALPERS, "[a]nyone
voting against ISS better have a very good reason to do so." In a 2003 report, the
Wall Street Journal described ISS as follows: "[ISS] has built.., a near-monopoly on
advising institutional investors, such as mutual funds and pension funds, on how to
vote on resolutions put before shareholders. A black mark from ISS could be very
harmful to a company...-209
B. ISS' Institutional Clients Have Final Say
ISS and its institutional clients are quick to point out that its clients are free
to vote their shares however they choose and that they are not contractually
obligated to follow ISS' advice. In theory, this sounds like an effective way to control
for potential ISS' agency costs, however, as discussed, many of ISS' mutual fund
clients such as Goldman Sachs and Janus Capital have instituted a default policy that
in effect encourages fund managers' to rubber-stamp ISS' recommendations. Should
a fund manager choose to vote shares contrary to ISS' recommendations the fund
manager must explain this decision and jump through several additional hoops
before he or she can do so. The default "opt-in" policy all but ensures that "follow
ISS" is the rule and not the exception. Moreover, approximately 15-20% of ISS'
clients have relinquished control of their proxy voting to ISS and have authorized
ISS to automatically vote their proxies however it sees fit.210
C. ISS is Constrained by the Market
A final objection that some might raise to the need to implement measures to
control for ISS agency costs is that market forces can already control for ISS agency
costs and that the value ISS places on its reputation as the go-to player in the
industry will provide incentive for ISS to conduct itself and perform its analyses in a
sound and reasonable manner.
The difficulties with this argument are several. First, the lack of competition
and high barriers to entry in the proxy advisory industry do not provide adequate
incentives or restraints for ISS to control agency costs. 211 Second, ISS continues to
209 Monica Langley, Want to Lift Your Company's Ranking on Corporate Governance? Buy
the Test, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2003, at Al.
210 See 2007 Annual Report, supra note 8.
211 See supra Part III.A.
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enjoy a significant first-mover advantage that provides a significant buffer against
market checks. Third and finally, because mutual funds have no real economic
incentive to police ISS and its advice, realistically mutual funds cannot be expected
to exert any real pressure on ISS to control for agency costs.
V. Potential Solutions
The following section examines potential solutions to this agency cost
problem. ISS is not accountable to the public, any regulatory body,212 the
corporations on which it provides CGQ ratings and proxy voting advice, the
shareholders of these corporations, or the market.213 Furthermore, several of ISS'
mutual fund clients have adopted a "Follow ISS" rule as the default and these
mutual fund clients currently have limited incentive to expend resources to exert
meaningful checks on potential agency costs. 214 To be effective, any solution targeted
at addressing ISS agency costs must be designed to meaningfully increase
accountability, with real consequences to ISS for failing to deliver on its promise to
provide sound proxy voting advice and reliable CGQ ratings.
Two solutions that have already been proposed are to have: (i) the SEC
clarify its 2003 proxy voting rules and affirmatively state that mere reliance by
mutual funds on a proxy advisor is not enough to satisfy a mutual fund's fiduciary
duties and (ii) the SEC directly regulate the proxy advisory industry.215 The
drawbacks to the first solution are that (a) it would probably amount to mere form
over substance and (b) increasing the monitoring requirements of a mutual fund
may simply result in the fund passing any increased costs on to the fund
shareholders in the form of increased fees. On balance, however, this solution
requires a relatively simple act on the part of the SEC and at a minimum it would
reduce a mutual fund's comfort in relying on ISS without an increase in the fund's
monitoring of ISS' decision process. Similarly, the second solution raises several
practical and philosophical concerns, such as (i) whether the SEC would be able to
212 While ISS does have some accountability to the SEC as a registered investment
adviser under the Adviser, its CGQ methodology and proxy voting decisions are currently
outside the scope of SEC regulation. See supra Part III.C. (discussing ISS' fiduciary duties
under the Investment Adviser Act).
213 See supra Part III.A., (discussing why ISS operates virtually free from market
discipline).
214 See text accompanying notes 130-33 (discussing examples of mutual funds which
have adopted a "Follow ISS" as their default proxy voting policy).
215 See Rose, supra note 28.
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regulate ISS' methodologies since this would look very much like "merit review,"
which is facially not part of the SEC's function; and (ii) regulating ISS and its
competitors may actually serve as additional barriers to entry.216
This article proposes three additional solutions to the ISS agency cost
problem. The first solution builds on the general call for direct regulation of the
proxy advisory and corporate governance rating industry and offers a specific
blueprint for constructing such a regulatory framework. The solution urges the SEC
to consider regulating the proxy advisory and corporate governance industry,
similar to the regulation it is currently contemplating for registered credit rating
agencies.
The second solution contemplates establishing an oversight board for the
proxy advisory and corporate governance industry similar in objective and mandate
to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) that was established
for auditors in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals. The intended goal of
this second proposal would be to implement systematic accountability and checks on
the proxy advisory and corporate governance rating industries.
The third solution focuses on incentivizing mutual funds to exercise their
right to vote on behalf of their underlying fund shareholders in a more meaningful
and diligent way. The objective of this third solution would be to encourage mutual
fund clients to pay more attention to the quality of ISS' and other proxy advisor's
decisions and not simply follow the vote recommendations of these advisors.
A. SEC Oversight and Regulation
The proxy advisory and corporate governance industry is analogous to the
credit rating agency industry in several ways. First, both are in the business of
reducing complex information down to a single number or rating (in the case of ISS
the "CGQ," in the case of Moody's and Standard & Poors a debt rating such as
"AAA" or "BB"), which is derived from a combination of the application of
proprietary models or algorithms, 217 and the input of qualitative factors and certain
assumptions that both types of rating firms include at their discretion.
216 Id. (discussing the drawbacks to having the SEC regulate the proxy advisory
industry).
217 In ISS' case, the primary proprietary model that is used is the Governance
Analytics Platform. An example of a model frequently used by credit rating agencies is a
quantitative expected loss model. See SEC NRSRO Proposed Rule, supra note 29.
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Second, corporate governance ratings like debt ratings merely represent the
ratings company's view of the soundness of a company's corporate governance or
creditworthiness, as the case may be. To varying degrees investors and the market
rely on these ratings in making decisions about the company that is being rated.
Simplistically speaking, in the case of credit ratings, it is a decision of whether to
purchase that company's debt; in the case of corporate governance ratings, it is a
decision about whether to buy or sell the particular company's stock, or whether to
pressure the company to change its practices in terms of management, the board,
governing documents or other operational directives.
Third, in the case of credit rating agencies, investors typically only look to
the credit ratings of the three largest firms in the industry - Fitch, Moody's and
Standard & Poors.218 This in turn causes the arrangers of debt issuances to overly use
these three credit rating agencies to obtain credit ratings for the securities that they
are bringing to market. Of course, in the proxy advisory and corporate governance
industry the over-reliance by the market on a particular firm is even more
pronounced - the market looks predominantly to ISS. Corporate boards know this so
they in turn feel an enormous amount of pressure to shape their business practices
and operations in a way that is pleasing to ISS, and which will hopefully result in a
high CGQ score. 219
Fourth, the methodologies and resulting ratings of both ISS and the credit
rating agencies have been roundly criticized as being flawed and misleading. For
example, Moody's has been cited for including erroneous data in their ratings of
some complex debt instruments and the ratings process of several NRSROs has been
critiqued for suffering from inherent conflicts of interests.220 Both of these concerns
have raised the specter that credit ratings may not be as reliable as the market would
like to believe. Similarly, as previously discussed, ISS' corporate governance ratings
218 See SEC NRSRO Proposed Rule, supra note 29.
219 This sentiment was summed up by noted securities lawyer Ira Millstein: "If [a
company's] governance is not getting a good grade, you go see them [referring to ISS] and
they tell you how to get a good grade."... "If that's not a conflict, I don't know what is."
Starkman, supra note 78.
220 See Lucchetti & Scannell, supra note 165 ("The Financial Times reported that data
errors were discovered after some of the early [complex debt instruments] were rated by
Moody's, and those errors went unreported.") See also SEC NRSRO Proposed Rule, supra note
29, at 35 ("...the NRSROs that rated subprime [debt instruments] have come under intense
criticism and scrutiny. It has been suggested that changes may be needed to address the
conflicts of interest inherent in the process of rating [these debt instruments].")
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have been cited as being tainted by conflicts of interests, being based on flawed
methodologies and assumptions, and being based on data that included errors,
mistakes and/or omissions.221
One key difference between the credit rating agencies and corporate
governance rating services is that in the case of credit rating agencies it is the
arranger or underwriter of the debt that seeks out and initiates the rating process. 222 In
contrast, in the case of corporate governance rating services it is the rating service
that initiates and produces the rating without prompting. This difference arguably
weighs more heavily in favor of regulating the proxy advisory and corporate
governance industry. Nevertheless, while the public and the SEC are now focused on
making the credit rating agencies more accountable, ISS and the proxy advisory
industry still operate virtually unfettered and free from restraint.
An examination of some features of the current proposed SEC credit rating
agency rules offers a guide for how effective SEC regulation of the proxy advisory
and corporate governance industry could be achieved.
On June 11, 2008, the SEC formally voted to propose "a comprehensive
series of credit rating agency reforms to bring increased transparency to the ratings
process and curb practices that contributed to recent turmoil in the credit
markets." 2  These proposals are a continuation of the initial authority the SEC
received from Congress in September 2007 allowing the SEC to oversee credit rating
agencies.22 4 The SEC released a series of three proposals (the "SEC NRSRO
Proposals") targeted at enhancing the accountability and soundness of the ratings of
NRSROs. The SEC NRSRO Proposals are designed to "address concerns about the
221 See text accompanying notes 95-96.
222 Another difference is that the anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that the credit
rating analysts employed by the NRSROs are more highly trained and sophisticated in
expertise than the analysts who ISS employs to generate its proxy voting advice and CGQ
scores.
m2 SEC Proposed Comprehensive Reforms to Bring Increased Transparency to Credit
Rating Process, http://sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-110.htm [hereinafter SEC NRSRO
Press Release].
224 The SEC's authority to regulate NRSROs comes form the Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006 (The "Rating Agency Act"). The Rating Agency Act was enacted on
September 29, 2006 is to "improve ratings quality for the protection of investors and in the
public interest by fostering accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit rating
industry." Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs to
Accompany S. 3850, Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, S. report No. 109-326, 109 th
Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 6, 2006), at 1.
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integrity of [the] credit rating procedures and methodologies of [NRSROs] in... light
of the role they played in determining credit ratings for securities collateralized by or
linked to subprime residential mortgages." 2
Several features of the SEC NRSRO Proposals are useful by analogy for
designing a regulatory framework for the proxy advisory and corporate governance
industry.
First, the SEC NRSRO Proposals would require that credit rating agencies
disclose the underlying information furnished by the issuer, underwriter or
arranger, which the agency uses in determining the rating.226 This proposal is aimed
at increasing transparency in the credit rating process, which in turn will hopefully
lead to more informed investors and greater competition in the credit rating agency
industry. By analogy, regulation aimed at increasing transparency in the proxy
advisory and corporate governance industry could require disclosure of the
underlying information and data used by the proxy advisor in generating its advice
and/or corporate governance rating.
Second, the SEC NRSRO Proposals "require enhanced disclosures about the
procedures and methodologies" 227 used by a credit rating agency in determining
credit ratings. The proposals are designed with the intent of enhancing disclosure of
the credit rating agency's methodologies "without intruding into the processes and
methodologies by which NRSROs determine credit ratings."2 Currently, the SEC
requires that a NRSRO provide general descriptions of its procedures and
methodologies for determining credit ratings. 229 These descriptions must be
"sufficiently detailed to provide users of credit ratings with an understanding of the
procedures and methodologies" 230 used by the NRSRO. The SEC NRSRO Proposals
would augment the current required disclosure, by requiring specific disclosure of
substantive factors such as (i) a description of how assessments of the quality of
originators of assets underlying the debt instrument affect the resulting credit
m See SEC NRSRO Proposed Rule, supra note 29.
226 See id.
227 Id. at 88.
228 Id. at 83.
229 See Instructions to Form NRSRO. The Instructions to Form NRSRO implements
the requirements of Section 15E(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §78o-7(a)(1)(B)(ii) (requiring that an application for registration as an NRSRO contain
information regarding the procedures and methodologies used by the credit rating agency to
determine credit ratings).
23 SEC NRSRO Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 88.
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information and (ii) how frequently credit ratings are reviewed and how changes
made to models and criteria affect resulting credit ratings.21 Taken together, the
current required disclosure and the proposed enhanced disclosure aim to provide
greater clarity for investors as to how credit ratings are derived.
It is easy to see how a similar regime of methodology demystification would
be helpful for the proxy advisory and corporate governance rating industry.
Requiring disclosure of the methodology underlying the CGQ and other corporate
governance ratings232 would provide greater clarity of the rating process to
shareholders, corporations, the public, and regulators, which would in turn lead to
better informed investors and an enhanced ability to assess the trustworthiness and
reliability of proxy voting advice and corporate governance ratings.
A third feature of the SEC NRSRO Proposals that could be replicated in a
regulatory regime for the proxy advisory and corporate governance rating industry
is the proposed requirement that NRSROs keep a record of all their ratings actions
and a record of the rationale for any material difference between the credit rating
implied by the NRSRO's rating model and the resulting credit rating issued by the
NRSRO. The intended purpose of this proposed requirement is to enhance
accountability, foster competition, and allow the SEC to independently examine and
"reconstruct the analytical process by which a credit rating was determined." 233 In
terms of the proxy advisory and corporate governance industry, requiring the
maintenance of records, which allow for independent reconstruction and critique of
resulting ratings and advice, would be a powerful, antidote to the current problems
of unaccountability, obscurity, and flawed ratings and advice, which are present in
the industry.
While it is premature to predict the effects of the new SEC NRSRO
Proposals, the SEC's proposed rules offer a model on which to base potential SEC
oversight of the proxy advisory and corporate governance industry. In addition, it
shows that a Congressional grant of regulatory authority to the SEC to oversee the
proxy advisory industry is not a dramatic leap. Any kind of SEC oversight
specifically targeted at transparency, accountability, and competition in the proxy
advisory industry would be a significant improvement over the void in which ISS
and its competitors currently operate.
231 Id. at 89.232 See discussion of other corporate governance ratings in Part I.A. supra.
233 SEC NRSRO Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 75.
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance
In addition, separate SEC regulation' specifically directed at the proxy
advisory industry would be preferable to relying on regulation vis-A-vis the Advisers
Act because (i) not all proxy advisors and corporate governance rating providers are
required to register as an investment adviser under the Adviser Act; and (ii) even if
they were to register, as currently drafted and interpreted, the Adviser Act and
corresponding rules would not require disclosure of ratings methodologies and
procedures, which is a key element of the agency cost problem.
B. Creation of Oversight Board
A central part of the Enron and WorldCom scandals was the role that
auditors played in the financial chicanery that eventually resulted in widespread
market turmoil and lack of investor confidence. Auditors came under fire for their
role in vouching for companies and transactions as above board, when the
information that came out after the fact indicated that these companies and
transactions were less than legitimate. Investors relied on auditor opinions in
making investment decisions.
The Enron and WorldCom scandals resulted in a period of reckoning and
reassessment of the role of auditors in relation to operating companies and whether
more oversight and accountability of auditors were required to restore investor
confidence and prevent a recurrence of the accounting frauds perpetrated in Enron
and WorldCom. Out of this unease, the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (the "PCAOB") was born.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act created the PCAOB to "oversee the auditors of
public companies in order to protect the interests of investors and further the public
interest in the preparation of informative, fair and independent audit reports."234
The sentiments underlying the creation of the PCAOB are similar in contour
and substance to the sentiments expressed by those concerned about the current
landscape in the proxy advisory and corporate governance industry. Like auditors,
ISS and other proxy advisors hold positions of significant perceived authority and
expertise on which the market relies. And like auditors in the wake of Enron and
WorldCom, there is a growing sentiment that an unrestrained and unaccountable
proxy advisory industry is a disaster waiting to happen.
234 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Our Mission,
http://www.pcaod.com (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
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Creation of an oversight board like the PCAOB, which would be designed to
provide systematic accountability of proxy advisors, could help alleviate several of
the concerns discussed in this article. General features of the PCAOB's mandate and
role, which could be replicated in designing an oversight board for the proxy
advisory and corporate governance industry, are (i) the creation of auditing and
ethics standards; (ii) the authority to conduct a continuing program of inspections;
(iii) a requirement that audit firms register with the PCAOB; and (iv) the grant of
enforcement action to the PCAOB to investigate and discipline registered public
accounting firms.235
C. Re-examining Mutual Funds' Exercise of Voting Authority
A mutual fund's authority to vote on behalf of its fund shareholders is not a
requirement of any legal rule, statute, case law, regulatory action or policy. The
requirement comes about as a result of the contractual agreement between mutual
funds and fund shareholders. In their contractual agreement, fund shareholders
grant mutual funds the authority to vote portfolio shares on the fund shareholder's
behalf.
While the law does not require mutual funds to vote portfolio shares on
behalf of fund shareholders, once mutual funds have acquired voting authority the
SEC does require that they exercise their voting authority in the "best interest" of the
fund shareholders. 236 This "best interest" requirement includes a requirement that
the mutual fund disclose to its clients information about the fund's voting policies
and procedures, and that the fund disclose to its clients how the clients may obtain
information on how the fund has voted their proxies. The SEC has also implicitly
blessed the prevalent practice by mutual funds of using proxy advisors as keeping
with the "best interest" standard so long as the mutual funds perform some due
diligence and satisfy themselves that the proxy advisor is not conflicted.237
235 Information about the PCAOB is available on their website,
http://www.pcaob.com.
236 See SEC 2003 Rule, supra note 22.
237 While the SEC has mentioned in broad strokes that mutual funds should
undertake some diligence of their own rather than merely rely on the advice of proxy
advisors, so far the SEC has not articulated precisely what this diligence would entail, nor has
the SEC specifically required that this diligence go beyond a conflict of interest check. For
example, diligence which focuses on how the proxy advisor determines the implementation of
its proxy voting policies or diligence on the soundness of the advisor's computational
methodologies are not explicitly required by the SEC's current line of no-action letters.
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While the impetus for enacting the SEC 2003 Rule was a concern that mutual
funds were voting portfolio shares in blind accordance with company management's
recommendations, so far the SEC has not taken any action to address the widespread
reliance by mutual funds on these third-party proxy advisors, even though these
proxy advisors are significantly less accountable and arguably more problematic
than their company management counterparts. This begs the question of what is
more in the "best interest" of fund shareholders: Is it follow accountable agents such
as company managers? Or is it follow unaccountable agents such as ISS and the
other proxy advisors? It also begs the question of whether the "best interest"
standard as currently interpreted is too lax in light of the fact that mutual funds have
imposed the duty to vote portfolio shares on themselves in contrast to this duty
having been imposed by operation of law. The SEC should reexamine its
interpretation of what satisfies the "best interest" standard and impose specific
diligence requirements, beyond conflict of interest checks, on the mutual fund
industry.238
In sum, designing viable standards and rules to address the problem of ISS
agency costs, and by extension that of the proxy advisory industry and corporate
governance rating industry, is a complex task. However, as leading corporate law
scholar, Professor Victor Brudney, aptly noted, "[t]hat agency costs are inevitable
does not preclude efforts to reduce them."239
Conclusion
This article makes the case that ISS generates significant agency costs and
that the traditional monitoring and control devices of market constraints,
transparency, fiduciary duties, and exit and voice, are absent in the case of ISS.
Furthermore, currently no effective control procedures exist for curtailing ISS agency
costs.
This result is troubling given the influence and centrality of ISS in corporate
elections and corporate governance affairs. It also has implications for several issues
currently being tackled in corporate law scholarship, such as concerns about
shareholder voting interests being decoupled from their economic interests;
balancing the push for greater shareholder rights with the concern that traditional
238 Id.
239 Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595,
617 (1997).
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board functions are increasingly being hijacked by institutional and activist
investors; and the challenge of defining and measuring what "good" corporate
governance looks like.
Finally, the current system in which an unaccountable and unregulated
agent wields such power and influence in corporate elections and corporate
governance standards is both conceptually at odds with corporate law agency theory
and practically perilous for the corporate enterprise. At the end of the day, should
ISS' proxy voting advice and corporate governance ratings prove woefully flawed, it
will not be ISS or the mutual funds that will have to bear the price; instead it will be
public companies, their long-term shareholders, and our corporate system.

